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Studies  in the   relationship between  social movements and their 
public perception have most generally  focused on  tactics and strategies, 
as major determinants of perception.     Focusing on  the   ideologies of 
social movements as cultural processes of symbol  trans format ion,   this 
thesis  suggests  the relationship between a movement's   ideology a.id  its 
host  symbolic universe   as a major determinant  of a public's perception. 
As  such,   the   thesis  is  an attempt to project  select   facets of Syr.bolic 
Interaction into the general  area of social  conflict  and social csr-ve- 
:zer.ts   for  the purpose of predicting the public perception of social 
—oveT.-=nt 3. 
A  theoretical  paradigm of three  symbol   transformation processes 
is developed and then utilized as  a  typology by which  ideologies of 
social movements are classified.     The research hypothesis,   asserting 
a difference of perception between the three change-process gro'ips, 
ar.d derived hypotheses,   predicting the direction of that difference,   are 
generated and then tested by administration of a research  instrument to 
I     iniple of 224  students  at the University of Sorth Carolina at Greensboro. 
The research  instrument   first obtains data on major cultural 
■: ;as and their  level of acceptance   for  the   sample population by using 
Sobin Williams'   description of major American culteral values a?  a 
begining base.     After this,   it obtains perception data   for  fourteen  re- 
cently active American social movements grouped by symbol  transformation 
".-   •-•'-   ?   -on-random sample was used,   data   -.h-a:-^   :--.-,   r.he  rewarr.t 
instrument provide strong support for the acceptance of both the research 
and derived hypotheses.  From these results the utility of considering 
symbolic change processes as predictive of the public's perception of 
social movements is demonstrated, and it is suggested such a theoretical 
framework may be useful in future research.   * 
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CHAPTER  I 
INTRODUCTION AND  REVIEW  OF SELECTED LITERATURE 
The main thrust of this thesis will deal with  ideology as an al- 
ternative symbolic universe  to the already objectified host   symbolic sys- 
tem within a given cultural group.     It will be an examination of the 
relationship of the variance of ideology to the public perception of 
social conflict.     In addition it will  examine  the relationship of ideol- 
ogy and the public perception of conflict as  they bear on the choice of 
strategies and tactics  for social movements. 
Ideology has   long been considered a crucial  component of social 
movements.    Most of the  theoretical-discussion concerning ideology has 
revolved around  two  definitions of the concept:     the particular defini- 
tion and the general definition.     The   former definition has been used 
more extensively in direct application to the  study of  social conflict 
and social movements.     This definition generally holds  that   ideology is 
a type of doctrine:     a very specialized,  compartmentalized  series of 
thoughts operative only in certain situations.     Usually  these situations 
are described as political   (in the most abstract sense)   and  intimately 
associated with power or the pursuit  thereof.     The particular definition 
implies,   especially on a common sense  level,   that  ideologies are held by 
only a small minority of the population who are associated overtly with 
social  change and social conflict. 
The general definition,  not usually applied directly to the  study 
of social movements,  holds ideology to be the pervasive world view of an 
individual or group.    As such,   ideology is not  considered a specialized, 
compartmentalized doctrine,  but as a general and non-compartmentalized 
process of viewing  the world.     In the general definition,   ideology need 
not be tied automatically to power considerations nor to political  situ- 
ations.     Instead,   the entire population may be considered active  in ideo- 
logical processes as defined in the general   sense. 
The first section of the thesis will be a review of selected lit- 
erature, while the second section will represent an attempt to formulate 
a paradigm outlining the symbolic and referential change processes which 
serve as the basis of the public perception of social  conflict. 
Ideology:     The  Particular Definition 
The particular definition of ideology is well suited  for the exam- 
ination of social movements at  levels of abstraction involving consider- 
ations of  social power and specific dynamics relating to  the accomplish- 
ment of change  in the  social order.     This   level of analysis has been very 
useful,  and one explored by most conflict theorists.     Ted R.  Gurr makes 
reference  to this level of analysis  in stating that "interpretations of 
revolutionary ideology attribute its normative justification of political 
violence  to  the  tactical requirements of a revolutionary movement and 
especially  to  the need to obtain mass  support   for violence   (Gurr,   1970: 
195)."    Gurr's  statement reiterates the particular definition of ideol- 
ogy by limiting it to the political  sphere and,  by implication,   suggests 
ideology is  simply the tool by which change is effected and tactics are 
justified. 
In a similar vein,  Toch states "the  term ideology denotes a set 
of related beliefs held by a group of persons;   the  ideology of a social 
movement  is a  statement of what  the members of the movement are trying to 
achieve,   and what  they wish to affirm jointly   (Toch,   1965:21)."    Once 
again ideology is  seen as the  tool of change while  the possible  input of 
ideology as  a  "cause" is not explored. 
Other uses of the particular definition of ideology are offered by 
Lenski and Coser: 
Ideology seems to have its greatest   impact   in  the more 
advanced societies.     Ideological variations of great magnitude and 
importance  for distributive  systems presuppose the existence of 
specialists in ideology,   supported by appropriate religious and 
political   institutions   (Lenski,   1966:436). 
Capitalists,   divided by their economic competition among 
themselves,   evolved a justifying ideology and a political   system 
of domination that  served their collective  interests.     Political 
power  and ideology thus  seem to be  serving  the same  functions  for 
capitalists that  class  consciousness   serves   for the working class 
(Coser,   1967:145). 
Lenski's  statement points  to the particular definition  in two 
ways.     First,   it ties  ideology  to the political arena  and hence  links  it 
to power  considerations.     Second,   it  suggests  that not everyone may en- 
gage  in ideological activity as  specialists are  required. 
Likewise,  Coser's  statement points to the particular definition 
of ideology.     It also   ties  ideology to political situations and power, 
but it also suggests  that  ideology comes by way of justification and as 
an afterthought.     In considering ideology sequentially second and sole- 
ly as a tool of change,   its  link to the  larger,  more general  symbolic 
processes of human beings may be obscured. 
Paralleling the theoretical use of the particular definition, 
ideology has  come to be  linked in the public's mind with proponents of 
some specialized doctrine.    Also,   since it  is generally tied to power 
and the pursuit  thereof,   it may connote ruthlessness and other derogatory 
characteristics.     Both Heberle and Mannheim address  this   facet of the 
particular definition of ideology succinctly in stating: 
In popular  language  the term  'ideology'   is often used  in a 
derogatory sense,   as if the political opponents were  intentionally 
dishonest  in their proclamations of purposes,  creeds,   and beliefs. 
In sociological  terminology,   'ideology'   has no  such derogatory 
connotation;   it designates merely a type of thought  structure 
(Heberle,   1951:28). 
The particular conception of ideology is   implied when the 
term denotes  that we are  sceptical of the  ideas and representations 
advanced by our opponent.     They are  regarded as more or  less 
conscious disguises of the real nature of a  situation,   the  true 
recognition of which would not be  in accord with his  interests 
(Mannheim,   1936:49). 
In the  treatment of ideology,   focusing on its utility and  func- 
tions  for   social movements, many theorists have developed useful  theories 
and typologies which link it  to power considerations.     While most of 
these  theorists devote  the majority of their work to  ideology in the 
particular definition,   they do,   at  some point  in their work,   indicate a 
belief in the  linkage of ideology to a   larger, more general  symbolic pro- 
cess while  declining  to develop  it at  this level  of analysis  for specific 
application to  the  study of social movements and social conflict. 
Daniel Bell  in The End of Ideology considers  ideology in the more 
narrow particular definition  (Bell,   1960).    While "relative deprivation" 
between groups has actually increased in recent years,   he makes reference 
to base   line  levels of "absolute deprivation"  in asserting the motiva- 
ting and recruiting power of ideology has dissipated as a result of the 
reduction of  the gross deprivations of many groups  such as  laborers, 
racial,   and ethnic groups.     Such an assertion clearly implies ideology 
is a  tool of change and hints  that  its utility or appeal   lies in its 
effective use  to effect change.     Bell,   and others,  assuming the partic- 
ular definition of ideology see social movements as arising  first and 
then generating  ideologies  to serve   their goals.    Assuming the general 
definition of ideology one would view ideologies as arising  first   (as  a 
result of basic  symbolic processes)   and then social movements being gen- 
erated to aid in the  objectification of the  ideology.     Both views are 
useful,   though derived from different  theoretical  levels and  focusing on 
different   facets of the change process. 
Traditionally,   the   former view has received the most considera- 
tion.    Addressing the relationship between these two views Crane Brinton 
states: 
No  idea,  no revolution!     This does not mean that ideas cause 
revolutions  or that the best way to prevent revolutions  is  to censor 
ideas.     It merely means  that  ideas  form a part of the mutually depen- 
dent variables we  are  studying   (Brinton,   1958:52). 
To   link ideology with power is a viable approach.     However,   it 
limits  the   level of analysis  and precludes  the  formulation of more gen- 
eral and abstract  statements concerning ideology.     The  level of analysis 
to which one  is   limited is,   of course,   the  social,  and this  level is an 
unsuitable one  for the   linkage of ideology to basic symbolic processes. 
The social   level   is unsuitable  for our purposes as power considerations 
will enter  into  the study of social movements and their ideologies,   ob- 
scuring their relationship  to  the  larger symbolic processes.     Since  the 
social  level   is  the level upon which objectifications of ideologies are 
projected,   and we  are primarily  interested in considering ideology's 
relationship   to  symbolic processes,   the cultural   level  is a more  suit- 
able choice.     The  cultural  level is more suitable as it  is  the  level pri- 
marily concerned with and constructed by the symbolic processes of human 
beings.    As used in this thesis,   a working definition of "culture" con- 
trasted with  a definition of "society" will be: 
In customary sociological usage, however,  culture refers  spe- 
cifically to  the values and ideas which give meaning to human social 
interaction but can be  considered somewhat  apart  from such inter- 
action.     Society,   on the other hand,   is used to refer to human social 
interaction  somewhat apart  from underlying values and ideas   (Popenoe, 
1974:82). 
For use on the cultural  level,   the general definition of ideology men- 
tioned earlier  is more appropriate than the particular definition. 
Ideology:     The General Definition 
The  second way in which ideology is used is with regard to the 
general definition of the concept.     The general  concept considers  ideol- 
ogy as  the total perspective or world view of an individual or group. 
Broadly speaking ideology becomes synonoraous with sub-cultures.     In this 
sense  everyone   (or group) has an  ideology which is pervasive and non- 
compartmentalized with regard to behavior. 
By looking at  ideology  from a general perspective one is   focusing 
on cultural  and  symbolic systems or more appropriately on the realm of 
meaning.     Therefore,   some aspects of a  symbolic  interaction perspective 
are useful as  it   focuses on a primary unit of concern to our discussion, 
symbols and their   formation.     Also,   Symbolic Interactlonism focuses on 
man's interactional use of those symbols  in constructing his  social order 
and generating meaning.     One disadvantage to examining ideology on this 
level is  that   facets of ideology such as tactics,   recruitment of members, 
and social power are difficult  to analyze and of less importance. 
In Ideology and Utopia, Karl Mannheim addresses the general defi- 
nition of ideology.    He  states that the general definition,   compared to 
the particular definition,   is more concerned with the  ideology of a  time- 
period or of a  specific  social group  (such as a  society,   a class,   or 
other  sub-division)  and with the characteristics and composition of the 
total  structure of the mind during this period or in this group.    He 
states more precisely: 
The  total conception calls  into question the opponents  total 
Weltanschauung   (including his  conceptual  apparatus),   and attempts  to 
understand  these concepts  as an out growth of the collective life of 
which he partakes   (Mannheim,   1936:57). 
Mannheim   felt  that   the particular conception of ideology was useful   for 
analysis on a psychological  level while  the  general conception of ideol- 
ogy referred not  to isolated cases of thought-content, but to   fundamen- 
tally divergent thought-systems and to widely differing modes  of experi- 
encing and  interpretation.    Another difference between the particular and 
general conceptions of  ideology is  found in their respective  foci and 
methods.     Mannheim says  "the  total conception uses a more   formal func- 
tional  analysis without  any reference  to motivations,   confining itself 
to an objective description of the  structural differences  in minds oper- 
ating in different  social  settings   (Mannheim,   1936:57)." 
As  stated earlier,   to use  ideology in the general sense  is to con- 
sider  it synonomous with  sub-cultures.     This is not as distant   from so- 
cial movements as it might appear as culture  itself is constantly chang- 
ing and in  flux as a result of modified environmental and social 
conditions.     Viewed  from this perspective,   social movements become part 
of a larger  change process,   though admittedly more obvious and intense 
than the pervasive cultural drift and evolution.     It  is because much of 
the cultural  change which occurs is of low intensity,   that much change 
goes unnoticed or passes under blanket terms of "progress" or "drift." 
The  salient  point  is   that  all  the processes of change  involve change  in 
systems  of symbols and their associated referents. 
Cultural Systems as Symbolic Systems 
Culture is made up of symbols which are arbitrarily created 
through consensus among human beings.  These symbols may be isolated in 
some instances or in formal systems of symbols which are internalized. 
As Clifford Geertz states: 
Symbolic systems are extensive sources of information in terms 
of which human life can be patterned—extrapersonal mechanisms for 
the perception, understanding, judgment, and manipulation of the 
world.  Culture patterns are 'programs'—they provide a template or 
blueprint for the organization of social and psychological processes, 
much as genetic systems provide such a template for the organization 
of organic processes (Geertz, 1964:62). 
In the final analysis, man's symbolic abilities constitute his only real 
qualitative difference from lower life forms. 
It is important to note that the concept "symbol" connotes two 
separate concepts which will be useful for our analysis.  First, of 
course, is the symbol itself (a word, sound, gesture) which is consen- 
sually validated by human beings for purposes of representing its asso- 
ciated referent.  In all cases, the symbol is a cultural vehicle which 
is empirical.  Second, the concept "symbol" implies its associated ref- 
erent without which it would have no meaningful existence.  The referents 
may be empirical or non-empirical, unlike their associated cultural ve- 
hicle. When the concept "symbol" is used in this thesis it is under- 
stood to imply both the cultural vehicle and the referent it represents. 
Whether speaking of one symbol or a complex of interrelated sym- 
bols, man's symbolic abilities enable him to engage in meaningful commu- 
unication both internally towards himself and externally towards other 
organisms.  The symbols he creates define reality and the objectifica- 
tion of the meanings attached to those symbols constitute the 
foundation of social order.  In this sense, a symbol system constitutes 
the basic tool and a plan of methodology for the dissection, perception, 
and evaluation of those phenomena the individual perceives in a given 
environment. 
Each society develops its own culture with regard to its environ- 
ment and salient experiences. Culture, however, as a cluster of symbols 
is not random or unrelated. As Glenn M. Vernon states: 
Man does not just attempt to develop a series of unconnected 
definitions about his world; he attempts to interrelate the various 
definitions, or at least part of them, in ways which appear to him 
to be logical and reasonable.  He develops symbol systems wherein 
part of the meaning of each symbol stems from the manner in which it 
is related to the other symbols in the system (Vernon, 1965:171). 
The symbols man uses fall into two main categories:  empirically 
referented symbols and non-empirically referented symbols.  Both types 
of symbols have plans of action or behavior associated with them.  For 
the study of social movements in general, and ideology in particular, the 
cluster of empirically referented symbols present at any one given time 
in a culture generally has little bearing on conflict activities and 
ideological thought.  Their referents are believed to be obvious, avail- 
able to all, thus making for much greater consensus over the associated 
plan of action or behavior. 
While non-empirically referented symbols have no referent that can 
be observed, the ontological assumption or belief that these referents 
are real constitute a powerful inducement for complying with the consen- 
sually validated plan of action.  To modify W. I. Thomas' famous state- 
ment, this is to say a referent perceived as real is real in its conse- 
quences (Thomas, 1928:572).  Regardless of the metaphysical questions 
involved, the behavior generated in response to the symbol is empirical. 
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Non-empirically referented symbols have a special  importance   for 
the  study of social movements and ideology.     Symbols of this  type are  in- 
timately  involved with conflict over meaning,  and hence are  crucial  in 
ideological  thought.    While all  symbols are  subjective  in meaning,  both 
with regard to   the  actual   linkage  of symbol  to referent  and the plan of 
action associated with that symbol,  non-empirically referented symbols 
are even more  subjective and thus more open to debate.     They are more 
open to debate  as there  is no empirical check that  can be evoked to val- 
idate  the boundary of the referent,   or,   indeed,   the manner in which that 
boundary is  to be drawn.     This condition sets  the stage   for considerable 
variation  in the plans of actions associated with such symbols.     Center- 
ed primarily around the non-empirical referent of "God",   the numerous 
and rich variations exhibited by  the religious  institutions of man pro- 
vide a good example. 
In addition,   symbols of this type are generally more pervasive  in 
their effect on human behavior than empirically referented symbols by 
virtue of  the fact that they transcend  sensory delineated reality. While 
empirically referented symbols connect us with the physical world and 
hence  influence  our behavior,   they do so only in specific,   time-limited, 
immediate  situations.     Non-empirically referented symbols may not be 
bound by such restrictions and thus  exert a more diffuse plan of action. 
As mentioned earlier,  because there may be much less consensus 
over the meanings  and associated behaviors  for  such symbols,  non-empiri- 
cally referented  symbols tend to be   foci of discussion,  debate,  conflict, 
and,   at times, violence.    Men and their  societies rarely go to war or 
form social movements over differing definitions of the symbols  "dog" 
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or "boat",   but men seem to have a definite  tendency to  fight and die over 
referential direction and the objectification of such non-empirically 
referented  symbols as "God",   "freedom",   "truth",  or "justice." 
Symbols with non-empirical referents are among  the most  powerful 
symbols man utilizes:     powerful in their effect on behavior,  powerful  in 
their ability to  cause an emotional response,  and powerful  in their abil- 
ity to  spark conflict and change.     This  is probably true because empiri- 
cally referented  symbols   tend to delineate man's relationship with  the 
physical world while non-empirically referented symbols  tend to delineate 
man's relationship to man. 
It  is not  surprising that symbols of this  type exert an  important 
influence on human behavior  in the  areas of conflict and ideological 
thought.     Cross-cultural and historical  surveys of the  two main social 
institutions which deal primarily in generating and manipulating  such 
symbols,   religion and politics,  yield an incredible panorama of human 
conflict  and  ideological activity. 
As used in this thesis cultural values are understood to mean the 
human ranking of symbols  and their associated plans of action according 
to functionality within a given environment.     In relation to  the organism 
and its physical environment,   functionality means  the economic expendi- 
ture of energy and resources  to achieve desired goals or ends deemed sub- 
jectively good, beneficial,  or useful  on either the  individual or the 
societal  level.    Most commonly there  Is a trade-off between these  two 
levels. 
For man, a symbolic creature, mere functionality with regard to 
the environment is necessary but not sufficient. By virtue of his 
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abilities,  he transcends the physical universe and must contend with 
functionality  in reference  to both it and dimensions of a more confusing 
and  less available nature.     He must also contend with  functionality in 
the  symbolic realm which,   in part,   connotes a non-empirical dimension. 
Since each symbol derives its meaning through its interrelatedness with 
other  symbols  in a complex system,  on this  level  functionality takes  the 
form of internal consistency with regard to  the boundaries of referents. 
On both  levels  functionality is  important  and the  symbols derived 
to explain,  order,   and orient man's actions are ranked according to 
judged cruciality.     Major cultural value  systems will be observed,  how- 
ever,   to be dominated by symbols which are non-empirically referented. 
The cluster of interrelated symbols which make up the culture of 
a group will,  of course,   contain both types of symbols  in a ranked fash- 
ion.     Regardless of the type  of symbol under discussion,   the  symbols 
which make up a given group's  culture are created with regard to  intern- 
al consistency.     This  is very similar to the  internal consistency which 
exists between the self definitions constituting the "self" of an indi- 
vidual.     To continue  this analogy,   the cognitive dissonance existing on 
the personality level conceptualized by Festinger may be perceived as 
having a counterpart on the cultural  level   (Festinger,   1957).     The cul- 
tural  form of dissonance may occur in two ways.     First,   there may exist 
symbols which are incongruent with regard to referential boundary or   in 
conflict with regard  to the behavior associated with each.     By virtue of 
existing  simultaneously and being operative in terms of behavior in the 
same culture,   tension and strain would be created.     Second,   there may be 
a chronic absence of objectification for one or more crucial symbols, 
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causing  tension and strain.     In the   first case  the  tension or strain is 
located within the  cultural  level, while  in the second case  the   tension 
or strain is between the cultural and social  levels.     Either may be oper- 
ative  in generating conflict or ideological activity. 
These  types of dissonance are always present  in any culture, 
though generally of low intensity and not of great  scope.     Concerning 
cultural  consistency,   it  is doubtful whether any system of symbols and 
their objectification has been developed which was  completely consistent. 
There does  exist a definite strain towards consistency which, while not 
automatic,   is  strong and effective.    As Glenn Vernon states: 
Since the definitions of a group are woven together into a 
somewhat  consistent pattern,   it  follows  that  the behavior of its 
members will also be organized or systematized.    Man's social order, 
whatever  it may be,   is a man-made order.     It  stems   from the culture 
he has  developed  (Vernon,   1965:171). 
The  crucial point which is being developed in this  section is that 
the existing order is  a manifestation or objectification of the accumula- 
ted meanings man has devised--these meanings lodged in symbols and their 
associated plans of behavior,   all of which are interrelated and inter- 
dependent. 
Symbolic  Systems as Symbolic Universes 
In the previous section the relationship of culture to symbols 
was explored.     Culture is,  at the base   level,   the  sum total of the mean- 
ings man has derived. 
The  totality of these meanings may be properly regarded as  the 
culture of the "symbolic universe" of the population  for which that  com- 
plex of meanings has relevance.    Berger and Luckmann offer definitions of 
symbolic universes  in stating: 
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These are bodies of theoretical traditions that  integrate 
different  provinces of meaning and encompass  the  institutional order 
in a  symbolic  totality  (Berger and Luckmann,   1967:95). 
The  symbolic universe is conceived of as  the matrix of all 
socially objectivated and  subjectively real meanings;   the entire 
historic   society and the entire biography of the   individual  are 
seen as events taking place within this universe   (Berger and 
Luckmann,   1967:96). 
Thus a   "symbolic universe" is  synonomous with culture which is 
composed of symbol   systems and the  objectification or  institutionaliza- 
tion thereof constituting the   foundation of the   social order. 
The major  function of the symbolic universe for a society is 
obvious:     the   society is the objectification or institutionalization of 
that universe.     Society could not exist without  its prior existence. 
Berger and Luckmann address this relationship in stating: 
The  origins of a symbolic universe have  their roots in the 
constitution of man.     Human existence is,   ab  initio,   an ongoing 
externalization.     As man externalizes himself, he constructs  the 
world into which he externalizes himself.     In the process of ex- 
ternalization,  he projects his own meanings into reality  (Berger 
and  Luckmann,   1967:104). 
For the   individual,   the major   function of the symbolic universe 
parallels  the   function of the ability to symbolize itself.     Basically 
this entails the typification,   categorization of phenomena,  physical and 
social,  within the environment of the  individual,   and the  specification 
of behavior relative  to  that phenomena.    According to Berger and 
Luckmann: 
This  nomic   function of the  symbolic universe   for individual 
experience may be described quite  simply by saying  that  it   'puts 
everything  in its right place'.     What is more, whenever one strays 
from the consciousness of this order  (that  is, when one   finds one- 
self in  the marginal  situations  of experience),   the  symbolic uni- 
verse allows  one   'to return to reality'--namely,   to  the  reality of 
everyday  life.     Since  this  is,  of course,   the  sphere  to which all 
forms of institutional  conduct and roles belong,   the symbolic 
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universe provides the ultimate legitimation of the institutional 
order by bestowing upon it the primacy in the hierarchy of human 
experience   (Berger and Luckmann,   1967:98). 
It is  important  to note  that no one   individual or group within a 
society can possess  the culture or  symbolic universe  in its  entirety. 
Rather,   each  individual or group has,   by virtue of life experience,   a 
subset of the  larger  symbolic universe which may be called a sub-universe 
or sub-culture.     Conceivably,  any number of sub-universes may exist with- 
in a society.     While discrepancies between these  sub-universes are    com- 
mon,   the variances are normally not great enough to preclude  effective 
communication or a modicum of  functionality for its possessor vis-a-vis 
other  individuals,  groups,  or the physical environment. 
With regard to variances between sub-universes,   the more crucial 
symbols,   being evaluated as central  in a given culture and hence   trans- 
formed into  intensely held values,  have a high probability of being in- 
cluded in discrete sub-universes.     This may occur,   as   sub-universe diff- 
erences generally tend to revolve around symbols relating to the 
particular nature of everyday  life in that  sub-universe, while greater 
consensus over  symbols related to  their  shared cosmology might be pres- 
ent.    This is  to say that modally the variances might be expected to be 
primarily among empirically referented symbols rather than non-empiri- 
cally referented symbols,  and that these variances usually would not 
result  in conflict behavior. 
Change  in Symbolic Universes 
The basic impetus in the development and accumulation of culture 
or  symbolic universes  is   found in the  symbolic processes of human beings. 
As its origin is parallel,   so too are the dynamics by which it may 
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undergo modification.     The   linkage between them is intimate.     In its 
most elementary  form,   this  process entails   the perception of a phenomenon 
and the arbitrary association between that phenomenon and a consensually 
validated  symbol such as a word,   utterance,   or gesture.     Thus  culture 
serves many   functions,  among the most  important being meaningful,  order- 
ed communication between individuals  and the motivation  for  individuals 
to participate  in social activities within the group.    While these may be 
crucial  functions,   they also point to  one causal determinant  in  the de- 
velopment of culture.     That   is,   functionality with regard to  the organism 
and its environment.     The symbolic universe of a group is predicated on 
the most  salient problems and exigencies experienced in their environ- 
ment.     The  total  symbolic universe  is  accumulated slowly and as  a result 
of the unfolding   facets or nuances of that environment.    After a period 
of time,   this  system comes close  to covering all possible events which 
happen on a predictable basis. 
In other words,   except  for continuing refinement or modification, 
the symbolic universe effectively confronts the major problems and sa- 
lient   features of that given environment at  that given time.    As Vernon 
has indicated,  it is out of this   symbolic system that man's social order 
is created—presumably in harmony with and consistent with  the meanings 
or values men attach to  those symbols. 
In time,  however,   the environment  (either physical or  social) may 
change   In ways which render the accepted symbolic universe and its ob- 
jectification dysfunctional or inadequate.    The resulting dissonance 
either within the cultural  level  itself or between the cultural and so- 
cial levels vis-a-vis consistent objectification is one root  cause of 
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conflict  on the  societal  level.     It  also may give rise  to renewed at- 
tempts at modifying the objectified symbolic universe  to  restore its 
functionality.     This renewed effort  is,  of course,   the  same process  that 
was responsible  for the development of the original symbolic universe, 
the  symbolic processes of human beings,  and is referred to as  ideological 
activity.     Referring to dissonance  in cultural  systems,  Vernon states: 
There is a conflict potential  in all aspects of culture,   in- 
cluding value definitions.     Since the evaluative behavior of the in- 
dividual  is in response  to  symbols and  is relative  to  the audience 
and to  the  situation,   it   follows  that changes  in the  situation and/or 
the  audience may lead to value obsolescence.     Once accepted value 
definitions may become  somewhat meaningless or   'sense-less', with a 
corresponding decline  in the   legitimacy of the existing  social order 
(Vernon,   1965:204). 
The existing order's  legitimacy must  decline as the  symbolic universe 
out of which it was created has been rendered partially dysfunctional. 
It  is out  of such a situation that change is indicated and conflict pos- 
sible or  inevitable. 
Berger and Luckmann address this  topic in stating  that   for there 
to exist  the possibility of an alternative  symbolic universe,   there   first 
must have been the objectification of an original symbolic universe re- 
sulting in an institutional order.     This original  symbolic universe, 
initially the theoretical creation of a primary group of individuals who 
considered the   institutional order as problematic,   is  solidly accepted 
by subsequent  inhabitants of that universe merely by virtue of its ob- 
jective existence  in the  society. 
As   long as the symbolic universe and its objectification remains 
functional,   there is understandably no problem or need for  further  legit- 
imization.     According  to Berger and Luckmann: 
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Specific procedures of universe maintenance become necessary 
when  the symbolic universe has become a problem.    As   long as  this is 
not  the case,   the  symbolic universe   is self-maintaining,   that  is, 
self-legitimating by the  sheer  facticity of its objective existence 
in the  society in question  (Berger and Luckmann,   1967:104). 
The "problem" which is  referred to  is the  same  concept  as  "dissonance" 
or "dysfunctionality" mentioned previously with regard to  symbol systems. 
When this dysfunction is  salient to a group of inhabitants within 
the symbolic universe  and the perception of that  shared dysfunction be- 
comes a  significant measure of their groupness,  they may be characterized 
as deviant   (from the perspective  of the  larger group of individuals  still 
accepting  the  institutional order)   and the carriers of an alternative 
definition of reality.     What  they are carriers of is an alternative  to 
the official definition of reality. 
The official definition of reality is maintained by a relatively 
small number of individuals with  the   full power of the  status £uo behind 
them,  with all that entails--namely,   the economic production of and un- 
equal distribution of scarce material and  social assets,   along with what- 
ever institutional power or authority that might have been granted to or 
taken by  that group.    To these  individuals who have a definite  stake in 
the maintenance of the  status quo resulting from the objectification of 
the  symbolic universe,  and to a much larger segment of the population who 
simply accept that order unquestioningly,   the new alternative definitions 
of reality are very  threatening as  they demonstrate  the official reality 
is neither a  sacred nor an inevitable order. 
This  symbolic dissonance,  resulting in differing definitions of 
reality and revolving,  as discussed earlier,  around high  intensity values, 
sets the  stage  for change in the symbolic universe and its 
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objectification through conflict. 
Ideology as an Alternative Symbolic Universe 
The symbolic expression of that change designed to remedy the per- 
ceived dysfunction in the existing order would be referred  to as  an ide- 
ology.     This  new symbol  system,  or at  least part of a  symbol  system, 
along with its  pressure   to be objectified,   represents  a new definition of 
reality--a new perspective or paradigm for reality testing.     It may 
emerge as a modification of the old system or as a new creation unrela- 
ted to  the old  system.     In this manner it may exist within or  stand out- 
side of its host culture  depending on how it differs. 
Though addressing himself to the topic of "scientific revolution", 
much of what Robert Friedrichs discusses  in A Sociology of Sociology is 
relevant  to change in symbolic universes and therefore,   ideology.     Par- 
ticularly,  his  coverage  of the central  thesis of Thomas Kuhn's The 
Structure  of Scientific Revolutions is most relevant.     Some  translation 
of Kuhn's  terminology to  converge on terminology used in this  thesis is 
necessary.     In a  literal  sense,   since a  symbolic universe is  the definer 
of reality for  its inhabitants,  and science,  as a cluster of normative 
elements relating to a disciplined mode of thought,   is  the reality  test 
instrument par excellence, both share the crucial characteristic of 
channeling human  thought  and behavior.     Beyond this,   science and the dis- 
ciplines  it encompasses are merely symbolic  sub-sets of the   larger  sym- 
bolic universe.     As a result,  both are paradigms which  test reality: 
one  is more diffuse and general,   the other more limited and specific. 
With this  in mind,  it  is  suggested that  "empirical  and theoretical 
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models" as used by Kuhn may be understood to approximate  symbolic uni- 
verses as used  in this  thesis,  and that  "science" as used by Kuhn may be 
understood as the model's objectification or society. 
Kuhn would argue,   in  fact,   that major shifts in empirical 
and/or  theoretical models  are grounded in what are essentially  'con- 
version'   experiences  in which a new  'world view'   competes almost  ide- 
ologically with an older  frame of reference.    There is  no simple, 
clean cut movement   from  'error'   to   'truth'.     What appears  is a com- 
peting   'gestalt'   that redefines crucial problems,   introduces new 
methods,  and establishes uniquely new standards  for solutions.     At 
the moment of polarization the devices and procedures  that mediate 
differences  in perspective and evidence  in   'normal',  non-crisis 
science   fail.    Advocates of alternative models talk past  one another, 
for there  is--at   least   for  that moment—no   fully  institutionalized 
framework of substantive  assumptions that both accept   (Friedrichs, 
1970:2). 
The  crucial point here is that  the new perspective represents an 
alternative  symbolic universe  that competes with the older,   objectified 
symbolic universe.     From the "particular" definition,   if that new per- 
spective evokes action,   such as  social movements,   or touches  high  inten- 
sity  facets of human  life,   it would be  considered an ideology.    As used 
In this thesis,  as a result of utilizing a  "general" definition,   any al- 
ternative  symbolic  system may be  considered an ideology. 
Additional  support may be   found in the work of Clifford Geertz. 
Addressing change in symbolic systems,  Geertz defines  ideology as  "a 
patterned reaction to   the patterned strains of a social role.     It pro- 
vides  a symbolic outlet  for emotional disturbances created by social 
disequilibrium  (Geertz,   1964:54)."    From the perspective used in this 
thesis,   the disequilibrium is  thought of as existing within the cultural 
level   itself and between the cultural  level and the social   level—not 
within  the  social level  itself as that would include considerations of 
"social power".     Geertz goes on to  say: 
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It  is a loss of orientation that most  directly gives rise to 
ideological  activity,   an inability,   for lack of usable models,   to 
comprehend the universe of civic rights and responsibilities in 
which one   finds oneself located  (Geertz,   1964:64). 
Once  again a modification of this statement is suggested—namely the   sub- 
stitution of the  term "system of interrelated symbols"  for the  term 
"models". 
Thus  it is  a conjunction of socio-psychological  strains created 
by the disequilibrium and a lack of cultural resources   (which is to  say 
interrelated symbol  systems and the behavior patterns   legitimized by 
them)   to understand that   strain that gives rise  to  ideological  thinking. 
Ideological   thinking being simply an effort  to modify old symbols or to 
create new ones  in order to understand and resolve  that   strain and act 
purposefully within the environment,   thus restoring  functionality. 
Karl Mannheim approaches  the  same  topic somewhat differently. 
Concerning  ideologies he  states: 
Every period in history has contained ideas  transcending  the 
existing order,  but  these did not   function as Utopias;   they were 
rather  the appropriate ideologies of this stage of existence as  long 
as   they were   'organically'   and   'harmoniously'   integrated into the 
world-view of the period (Mannheim,   1936:193). 
Mannheim is  implying that new ideas which are  situationally  transcendent 
but remain within the old order or are  integrative modifications of the 
old do not present revolutionary potentials and are Utopias.     The differ- 
ence between the  two  is  found in their potential  for realization and the 
degree  to which they differ  from the old order.    Their similarities are 
that they both represent  alternative  symbolic systems or,  at   least,  a 
part of a  symbolic system. 
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Ideology and  the Public Perception of Social Conflict 
By viewing ideology from the general definition,  one  is constrain- 
ed to analyze symbolic,   and thus meaning  systems.     In the  course of so 
doing,   the question of the relationship of ideology  to the public per- 
ception of social conflict  frequently occurs.    Most research assumes  the 
relationship is  that  the   specific tactics and  strategies of a  social 
movement  are primary determinants involved in the public's perception— 
particularly if  those  tactics were violent.    At   first glance,   Ralph 
Turner  seems  to   lend support to this view when in setting   forth condi- 
tions under which one group of people will define a  social conflict  as a 
disturbance  and another group as social protest, he  states: 
1) Publics test events  for credibility in relation to   folk con- 
ceptions of social protest  and justice. 
2) Disturbances communicate  some combination of appeal and threat 
and the balance   is important  in determining whether the dis- 
turbances are regarded as protest or not   (Turner,   1969:817- 
818). 
In the first statement the possibility occurs  that  the symbols of 
"social protest" and "justice" with their associated meanings are merely 
part of the  cultural milieu out of which the old order was  created.   With 
this in mind,   "folk conceptions of social protest and justice" may be 
thought of as cultural values.     The public  is  testing  then   for goodness 
of fit between two symbolic  systems which must be at   least partially 
divergent.     This appears true,  or why else would there be  two competing 
symbolic  systems  in existence?    As Turner and Killian later  state,   it  is 
impossible  to  conceive of a  social movement aside   from the   fact  that dis- 
satisfaction exists with the existing social order. 
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In the second statement  the possibility occurs   that   the  appeal 
Turner speaks of is   the promise of eliminating some dysfunction in the 
existing order, while  the threat  is the possible destruction of that 
order, which implies  from a human perspective a painful adjustment pro- 
cess  to a new order.     Thus  the balance  is between the pain of existing 
dysfunction against   the  inherent pain of change  itself. 
Considering Turner's statements  in this manner and reflecting 
further on ideology as an alternative  symbolic  system,   one comes  closer 
to considering ideology as central in determining the public's perception 
of a given social movement.     In doing  so,  curiously one  comes   to the con- 
clusion that  the  earlier  statement of the relationship of ideology to the 
public's perception of social conflict  serves best when reversed.     That 
is,  perhaps   it is the public's  definition or perception which is causally 
linked to  the choice of specific tactics and strategies.     The public's 
perception is,  of course,   determined by their acceptance of the host 
symbolic universe in which they find themselves located.     While indi- 
viduals may differ in  their specific choices  to problem solutions and in 
their quickness to respond with violence, we would assume men to be 
basically rational and purposeful within the confines of their  symbolic 
universe or an alternative universe—making  this assumption  for both the 
individuals  in the  larger society and  those  involved in social change 
movements. 
At  this point,   it  is  suggested that it may be the  anticipated pub- 
lic perception,  deduced by those  in the movement responsible   for intel- 
lectual and ideological   functions,  which constitutes the rationale  for 
the choice of tactics  and strategies.     If this  is assumed  to be  true, 
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then one  Is back to   the  cultural or  symbolic  levels where meaning  is 
couched and one  is really speaking of the relationship of processes of 
change in  symbol  systems   to the public perception of social  conflict. 
C.   Wendell King offers   further support   for this view in Social 
Movements  in the United States.     Concerning the relationship of a social 
movement's  consistency with the  society's  general culture and variance 
in its reception by the  larger population he states: 
Some degree of consistency with the society's general culture 
is essential  if a movement  is to  find acceptance.    But how can there 
be compatibility with  the very culture which the movement   is commit- 
ted to  changing?     This  apparent  contradiction is resolved by recall- 
ing that  the mass   society is characterized not by a neatly integrated 
culture but  rather by a diversity of sub-cultures.    And even though 
certain value-orientations   (for example,   success and equality)   can 
be  identified amid the heterogeneity of American society,   the   fact 
remains  that no movement need be  compatible with all  these   society- 
wide orientations  to be acceptable.     Few movements have ever sought 
to change an entire  society or,   indeed,  have had a relevance   for 
every one of the major value configurations   (King,   1956:86). 
Movements  therefore   face two criteria of cultural acceptabil- 
ity:     the broad normative code of the   society as  a whole and the 
various codes of subgroups within the  society.     The chance  of accept- 
ance  is,   of course,  greatly increased when some of the objectives and 
activities of a movement are consistent with norms of the general  so- 
ciety and are also consistent with norms of the particular subgroups 
(King,   1956:100). 
Beyond the  fact  that compatibility of a social movement's ideol- 
ogy with the general culture of the  society may determine its reception, 
it  suggested that  the precise way in which  the  ideology differs   symbol- 
ically  from the host culture and on what major value orientations will 
have important causal  input  into:     a)   the public's perception of the 
movement,  and b)   the movement's  tactical response.     Following these 
lines of thought,   the  second chapter of the  thesis will be an attempt  to 
look closer at  the processes which may be operative and to  design a 
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viable paradigm to represent them with "predictability"   in mind. 
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CHAPTER  II 
A  PARADIGM OF  CHANGE  PROCESSES 
IN  SYMBOLIC UNIVERSES 
Before proceeding to isolate and describe symbolic change process- 
es operative  in symbolic universes,   several preliminary topics will re- 
ceive consideration.     First, we will examine  the question of what exact- 
ly is changing as perceived by the author,   and second,   the crucial 
question of what   is meant by "meaning." 
The Question of Change 
This thesis has been designed to  limit  its discussion of ideology 
and conflict to  the cultural or symbolic levels.    Thus  far the progres- 
sion of the   thesis has dealt with the relationships between,  and dynamics 
of:     1)   symbols,   2)   their referents,   3)   symbolic universes   (the  totality 
of interrelated symbols), 4)   the objectification of symbolic universes, 
and 5)  change in symbolic universes as expressed by alternative universes 
(ideology). 
Discussion of these concepts  separately was judged necessary to 
provide general  theoretical grounding   for a possible paradigm depicting 
the relationship of ideology as a  symbolic change process  to a)   the pub- 
lic's perception of conflict,  and b)   the choice of tactics and strategies 
for social movements organized around  that  ideology.     To go  further and 
construct  that paradigm,   it  is necessary to reintegrate some of these 
concepts with regard to their crucial  similarities and dynamics.     This 
will have  the effect of projecting the  discussion to another  level of 
27 
analysis which in one  sense is more abstract and in another  sense more 
concrete. 
By way of reintegration it  is suggested,   first,   that  the differ- 
ence between symbols and symbolic universes is  a quantitative one.     With 
regard to origination,  accumulation,  and change therein,   the  symbolic 
processes  are  identical on the  level of abstraction we wish  to remain. 
Therefore,   there  is no  further utility in considering them as distinct. 
Thus we will retain symbols as  the basic  focus of examination while de- 
leting symbolic universes  for the  purpose of isolating symbolic change 
processes   that  ideology may represent. 
Second, with regard to objectification of symbolic universes and 
symbols,   it  is  suggested that any distinction drawn between the  two is 
also a quantitative one--not a substantive one.     Thus objectification 
will henceforth be   limited in discussion,   for the purpose of analysis,   to 
symbols as  the basic  focus of examination. 
Third,   for purposes of clarity and to   facilitate discussion,   the 
synonomous  concepts of "change  in symbolic universes",  "alternative sym- 
bolic universes",   and "ideology" will be replaced by the single concept 
of ideology. 
In performing this reintegration, we are   left with three major 
concepts:      1)   symbols,   2)  their objectification,   3)   the proposed change 
of both  (1)   and   (2),   ideology. 
Now we may proceed with greater clarity to examine exactly what  is 
changing.     The statement that  ideology is  the expression of change   for 
symbols and their objectification is both useful and at  the  same  time 
misleading. 
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The useful part of the statement  is  that there does exist a con- 
sistent  strain towards consistency or congruence both among symbols them- 
selves on the cultural level vis-a-vis  their referential boundaries,   and 
between  symbols and their consistent objectification on the  social   level. 
Just as dissonance was observed earlier  to be possible on both  levels, 
then the  strain towards consistency must also be operative on both levels. 
One level on which dissonance may occur is with regard to referen- 
tial boundaries on the cultural level and has an associated effect on the 
social level. That is, the dissonance between referential boundaries on 
the cultural level will automatically result in dissonance between their 
respective objectifications on the social level--barring the exercise of 
social power to the contrary. Graphically, the relationship between the 
two  levels of dissonance  is  shown in Figure 1. 
This  dissonance on the  social  level occurs concomitantly and for 
our purposes  represents only one  form of dissonance   for which ideology 
may express remedial action.     From this point  on,   this   form of dissonance 
will be referred to  as "referential boundary dissonance"—with the under- 
standing that it has a concomitant  form of dissonance vis-a-vis  objecti- 
fication on the social level. 
A   second major   form of dissonance may be between the  symbol and 
its  consistent objectification.     Leaving behind social power considera- 
tions which would entail questions of whom would actually prevail  in 
asserting their varying definition,   theoretically,   to advocate change  in 
its objectification and vice versa.     Theoretically,   leaving power con- 
siderations aside,   it  follows  that to actually change   the symbol's 
boundary is   to ensure  its objectification will  reflect  that  change and 
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Figure  1 
Graphic Relationship of Levels of Dissonance 
Symbol^ (Dissonant)- Symbol, Cultural Level 
Objectification.   ---(Dissonant)—-Objectification2 Social 
Level 
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vice versa. 
Thus   ideology does express advocated change on both levels and  is 
in reference  to both forms of dissonance which can occur. 
The misleading part of the  statement  is that  the  symbols  them- 
selves do not change or,   if they do,   it is of no consequence.     The  sym- 
bol is an arbitrary vehicle which represents the referent.    Thus  symbols 
such as  "house",   "casa",   "villa",  or "dacha" may differ yet refer to  the 
same referent.     Any change  in symbols without a concomitant change in 
the referential boundary is really no change at all. 
To answer  the question of what exactly is changing,   it is the 
boundaries of the referents and their objectification as it reflects  that 
change and vice versa.     Ideology may be considered the expression of 
change aimed consciously at possibly one or the other but, most generally, 
both simultaneously.    Whether consciously intended on both or not,   the 
net effect   is  on both. 
The Question of Meaning 
The potential   for meaning may be   found in the separation of refer- 
ents by  their boundaries which are expressed and maintained symbolically. 
When a phenomenon is dissected on the basis of its relationship to other 
phenomena   (regardless of whether it  is an objectively real empirical phe- 
nomenon or a  subjectively real non-empirical phenomenon)   the symbolic ex- 
pression and maintenance of that dissection becomes the boundary by which 
it  is kept  separated from other phenomena and hence manipulable  for pur- 
poses of human  thought.     It is the ability to perceive  this relationship 
or boundary and the  simultaneous labeling thereof for  the purpose of 
"re-presentation"  in the human mind that  is at  the heart of symbol 
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formation. 
The relationship between referents may be  thought  of as represent- 
ing the process by which the phenomena were originally dissected on the 
basis of category,  use,   source,   sequence,  or other characteristics con- 
sidered  salient  in that given environment.     This relationship is   the 
rationale   for the existence of discrete referents and is  responsible   for 
any symbolic meaning that  can be attached to the referent's symbol. 
Considered as  such, meaning as used in this  thesis  lies in the  symbolic 
expression and maintenance of referential boundaries with change  advoca- 
ted on the  referential boundary changing its associated meaning.     In a 
similar vein,   since  the meaning of the  symbol on the cultural  level is 
directly reflected in its objectification on the  social  level,   to change 
the objectification of a  symbol on the social  level is  to change its 
meaning on the cultural   level in terms of its referential boundary. 
To tie some of the concepts  covered earlier and to   lead into the 
actual  construction of a paradigm relating to ideology and the public's 
perception of social conflict,   it  is of benefit  to reiterate some cen- 
tral points: 
First,   that  ideology is a  symbolic process  linked to the basic 
processes of the human mind and shares  the  same dynamics. 
Second,   that  ideology is an expression of an alternative symbolic 
system in opposition to the official,  objectified one and is  in response 
to two major   forms of dissonance.    As  such,   it has change  implications 
for both the  symbolic   (cultural)  and objectified  (social)   levels. 
Third,   that on the   level of symbols,   ideology is the  expression of 
advocated change on referential boundaries and/or  the objectification of 
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same. 
Fourth, that values and norms at this level of analysis represent 
symbols and their objectifications ranked according to judged cruciality 
and salience  in a given environment. 
Fifth,   that  social movements may receive differential  reception 
from a host culture on the basis of the way in which  the  ideology of 
that movement  differs or is  in opposition to  the major values  and norms 
of the host culture. 
From these points ideology may be considered as a symbolic pro- 
cess of referential boundary and objectification change having direct im- 
pact on  the way the movement  associated with  it is received.     This diff- 
erential  reception is associated with the precise ways  in which change is 
advocated.    The  identification of  those ways,  with any predictive power 
they may have,   is the crux around which the construction of the   following 
paradigm revolves. 
Ideology as a Symbolic Process £f Referential Change 
and the  Public Perception oj: Social Conflict 
In addition to assuming some basic symbolic interaction perspec- 
tives,  equilibrium perspectives are drawn upon.     Also,   for purposes of 
analysis only,   assumptions of analogous   linkages between components and 
processes associated with the individual  level and components and pro- 
cesses associated with the cultural  level are being made.    Although it is 
stated earlier,   one of the most crucial assumptions being made   is  that 
men are basically rational and purposeful creatures.    While this may not 
appear true  from the  "out-perspective" of an alien symbolic universe,   it 
is, however,   certainly true that  all men,  physical and mental pathologies 
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aside    are rational  and purposeful within the confines of their own  sym- 
bolic universe.     Quite   literally it  is "man the meaning-seeker" which 
provides  the departing point   for the construction of  this model. 
At an earlier point  in this paper  the  concept of "cultural disso- 
nance" was  introduced and merits  further explication at this  time.     Cul- 
tural  dissonance will also be understood to have a concomitant objectifi- 
cation or  social dissonance as used  in this paper.     To   further explicate 
the concept,   an analogy must be drawn between   it and  the "cognitive 
dissonance" of the personality level. 
Within individual  personality structure,   the concept referred to 
as the  "self" is comprised of symbolic definitions  (symbols and  their 
associated plan of behavior),  however,   some of  these are more  salient 
and central   than the  others  around it.    These  constitute  a complex of 
core definitions which are more  stable and  less  likely to change.     The 
remainder of  the   self definitions are built around these  in a consistent 
manner.     If one  of the core  definitions  is  threatened  the entire  system 
is threatened.     This occurs because  the remaining definitions are  inter- 
linked with the  one being  threatened.     The  situation   is very much  like 
pulling out   the  cornerstone   from the   foundation of a building. 
These  definitions making up  the  self  (both core and otherwise) 
oust be   internally consistent.     If they are not,  cognitive dissonance 
occurs,   yielding  tension which must be dealt with.    Usually it takes a 
great deal of trauma  to reach and  threaten these core definitions as 
,:,y are well protected and defended  in accordance with  their highly im- 
portant  role. 
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Just  as within each individual, within each society the respective 
culture  is made up of symbolic definitions with the society itself made 
up of their objectifications,   though some of these definitions are more 
crucial, more  central than the others.     These constitute a complex of 
definitions which may be called "core cultural definitions" or core val- 
ues.    They are best described as being of high  intensity and may be 
shared with other distinct cultures or they may be unique.     In saying 
they are high  intensity definitions or values it  is meant  they are  the 
most  important and salient definitions to  that  society in that environ- 
ment. 
Looking at American society,  Robin Williams provides a  list of 
definitions or  values he has  isolated as being "core values".     These are 
not ranked according  to  their relative intensity, but in part,   they are: 
1) Concepts related to achievement and success 
2) Concepts related to work and activity 
3) Moral  orientation concepts 
4) Humanitarian concepts 
5) Efficiency and practicality 
6) Progress 
7) Material comfort and wellbeing 
8) Equality 
9) Freedom 
10) External  conformity 
11) Science and secular rationality 
12) Nationalism and patriotism 
13) Democracy 
35 
14)     Individualism 
While this is not  an exhaustive  list of the central values of 
American society,   it  does  illustrate  some of the more  important anchors 
around which the remainder of the culture is built in accordance with 
internal consistency.     Obviously these are not  shared by everyone,  nor 
does everyone mean exactly the   same thing when he speaks of them.    How- 
ever,   they are assumed to be legitimate and useful by a majority of the 
population who define  them with a modicum of consensus.     However this 
majority is defined  (and it is rarely a numerical majority),   their con- 
sensus over   the meaning and objectification of these values becomes the 
official definition of social reality which has been discussed earlier. 
When  the official definitions of social reality and their objecti- 
fications in the  existing order become dysfunctional,  groups of individ- 
uals who are   touched by that dysfunction may create new definitions of 
social reality.     In so doing, cultural dissonance occurs,  causing strain 
and tension which must be resolved in some way.     On a behavioral level, 
the tactics  of individuals and collectivities may vary extensively in 
their attempts to resolve  this dissonance; however,  these variances 
appear  in part  to  be determined by the reaction of the host  culture.     In 
saying the host culture's reaction is based on the intensity associated 
with the values and norms undergoing attack, we are now bound by partic- 
ular cultures with regard to  the application of the paradigm under con- 
struction.    At  this point we have  gone as  far as we can in attempting to 
make general   statements about ideology's relationship to   the public per- 
ception of social  conflict,   and to go further it  is necessary to remain 
strictly on  the symbolic  level to explore the ways  in which referential 
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boundaries and the objectification of their meanings may undergo modifi- 
cation. 
Examination of change  in referential boundaries and  their objecti- 
fications yields   three processes by which change,  as defined  for this 
model,   is possible.     The   first  two, universalism and particularism,   are 
dialectically opposed subsets of the more primary and general process of 
abstraction.     In the case of universalism and particularism,  by virtue 
of limitations and  fixed starting points of referential boundaries  im- 
posed by the   interrelatedness of the  symbols composing the  symbolic uni- 
verse  in which they occur,   they are constrained  to be modifying process- 
es.     They modify what  is  already referentially bounded and objectified 
and remain within the   symbolic universe  in which they operate. 
The third process, antitheticism, _is abstraction in a different 
situation though not bounded by the limitations described above. It is 
not bound by the interrelatedness of the symbols in any symbolic system 
and redefines referential boundaries in a radically different way which 
is incompatible with the previously existing system. Thus, it is out- 
side of the symbolic universe and constitutes a creative, from scratch, 
process. 
Universalistic  Change 
As mentioned above,   the   first  process will be referred to as uni- 
versalistic  change   (also referred to later  in this thesis as Type  I 
change).     In this process,   the change-oriented group or individual   is 
seeking  to  enlarge or reduce the boundary of a referent or its objecti- 
fication such that  the net result of the action would be to make  the 
symbol's  referent  and its objectification more  inclusive or universal. 
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It would appear at   first paradoxical that  to reduce  the boundary of a 
referent could make it more universal.    This occurs because  there  is no 
direct  link with the   size of a referential boundary or  the way in which 
it is drawn to its abstraction or concreteness.     The universalistic ac- 
tion of the process  lies  in the change of the referential boundary 
vis-a-vis all other referential boundaries  in that symbolic  system.     In 
advocating universalistic change,   a change-oriented group  is building or 
adding to what has already been referentially bounded and objectified. 
The  larger host  society does not have to give up anything or unlearn any- 
thing—either symbolic or behavioral.     It must, however,   accept  something 
new such as  a new degree,   scope,   or additional dimension of the existing 
symbolic definitions.     As an abstract process,   some of the more  salient 
features of universalistic   (Type  I)  change are: 
1) It broadens the  inclusiveness of the referent by enlarging or 
reducing its boundary. 
2) It represents a  further step in generalizing the referent in 
relationship  to all other referents in that system. 
3) It is basically an integrative process by virtue of consolida- 
tion. 
4) In terms of the  social action system advanced by Parsons,   it  re- 
presents  an increase  in the cybernetic potential of  the symbol 
(Parsons,   1966).    Also it is orienting or  legitimizing the sym- 
bol towards the next highest  level sub-system of action which, 
since  it   is already on the cultural  level,   is to say the  "higher 
environment".    By moving towards  the higher environment,   this 
process   tends  to move  the referential grounding of the  symbol 
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towards an ontological  source,   thus sacralizing the  symbol,   Its 
boundary,  and  Its objectification. 
5) It  implies a more pervasive behavior pattern associated with the 
symbol.     It becomes a more powerful  symbol  in terms of individual 
behavior  and general societal direction. 
6) The process tends to elevate the  symbol within the  complex of 
core values. 
Particularistic Change 
Again as mentioned before,   generally conceptualized,   the  second 
process will be referred to as particularistic change   (also referred to 
later  in this thesis as Type II).     In this process,   the change-oriented 
group or   individual is  seeking  to enlarge or reduce  the boundary of a 
referent or its objectification such that the net result of the action 
would be  to make  the  symbol's referent and its objectification more ex- 
clusive,   specific,  or particularistic.     Once again,   it would appear at 
first paradoxical  that   to enlarge  the boundary of a referent  could make 
it more particularistic.     As mentioned earlier,   this occurs because  there 
is no direct   link with the  size  of a referential boundary or the way in 
which it  is drawn to  its abstraction or concreteness.     Again,   the partic- 
ularistic action of the process   lies  in the change of the referential 
boundary vis-a-vis all other referential boundaries  in that  symbolic sys- 
tem.     In performing particularistic change,   the change-oriented group  is 
obscuring or destroying ]>art of what has already been referentially 
bounded and objectified before.     Since that which has been previously 
learned and objectified behaviorally,  will,   in all probability,  have  spe- 
cific relevance  or impact on a  segment of the   larger population,   its 
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change will be opposed more  intensely than universalistic change.     This 
occurs because   it will require a more active adjustment.     As  an abstract 
process,   some of the more salient   features of particularistic  (Type  II) 
change are: 
1) It narrows  the   inclusiveness of the referent by enlarging or re- 
ducing its boundary. 
2) It  represents a   further  step in specifying the referent  in rela- 
tionship  to all  other referents in that  system. 
3) It  is basically a differentiating process by virtue of dispersion 
or division. 
4) In terms of the  social action system advanced by Parsons,   it 
represents a  decrease  in the  cybernetic potential of the symbol. 
Also it  is orienting or legitimizing the  symbol towards the next 
lowest  level  sub-system of action,  which,   since it  is already on 
the cultural   level,  is   to  say the "social or individual" levels. 
By moving towards the  societal or  individual   levels,   this process 
tends  to movo  the referential grounding of the   symbol  towards an 
empirical source,   thus   secularizing the  symbol,   its boundary,   and 
its objecti.fication. 
5) It  implies a  less pervasive behavior pattern associated with the 
symbol.     It becomes a  less powerful  symbol in terms of  individual 
behavior and general societal direction. 
6) The process tends   to  lower  the symbol within the comples of core 
values. 
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Antithetical Change 
Broadly  speaking this  is basically revolutionary change.     It re- 
presents   the  total  destruction or obscuring of the referential boundary 
and its objectification.     In a theoretical vein,  one can perceive anti- 
thetical   (Type  III)   change as a   final resort  and a rarely occurring 
event  when compared to the continuing interplay between  types  I and II. 
While   types I and II are  on one level diametrically opposed,   on 
another  level  they share one thing in common—they both are modifying 
processes, modifying what  already exists.    This is contrasted with Type 
III which appears more  as an experimental or creative venture.     Thus 
Type  III is perceived as a result of the  failure of types  I and II to 
effectively modify the referential boundary to restore  functionality. 
Functionality means  the achievement' of desired goals or ends which are 
deemed subjectively good,   beneficial, or useful on either the individual 
or the  societal   level—though most commonly there is a  trade-off between 
the two.     Failure occurs when the environment changes  enough or in a 
certain crucial way such that  all possible combinations of the two other 
types of change,   I and II,  are insufficient and ineffective to restore 
functionality to an acceptable  level.    When this occurs one has exhaust- 
ed  the modifiable potential of the  referential boundary and its objecti- 
fication,   and the only alternative  is  to discard the old and replace  it 
with a new one. 
Mixed Processes 
The  three   types of change outlined earlier must be considered as 
ideal-types.     As   such there   is a high probability that many social move- 
ments are  advocating change of differing  types on more than one core 
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cultural value.     Thus   they could be advocating Type I change on one 
value,  Type  II on another,  and Type III on yet another.     As conceptual- 
ized it  does not   seem possible that one could perform two  types of 
change on a referential boundary simultaneously.     Since  the  focus of this 
thesis is primarily on the public's perception of that movement,   it is 
suggested that we   focus on the highest cultural value undergoing change, 
identify that change,   and  then regard the movement as being primarily 
associated with  that type of change.     This assumes that within the  com- 
plex of core values there   is a hierarchy of values,  and that all  symbols 
are not of equal  importance and ranked according to cruciality or sali- 
ence.     It  also reasonably assumes that the public will react  to the 
change being  advocated on the highest cultural value  as the major deter- 
minant of its evaluation. 
Examples of Change  Processes 
Confining oneself to American  society,   illustrations of these 
three  types of change would be as follows: 
1) Universalistic change:     The Civil Rights Movement  as  it  is con- 
cerned with expanding the core values of  freedom and equality. 
2) Particularistic change:     The Ku Klux Klan in the sense  that   it is 
concerned with the marrowing of the core values of  freedom and 
equality. 
3) Antithetical change:     Counter-culture movements such as  "flower 
children,  hippies,  or drug cultures" in  the  sense  they are con- 
cerned with the replacement of the core values of conformity, 
activity,  and achievement. 
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The example of antithetical  change is also an example of a mixed 
process as it is expanding the core values of individuality and   freedom 
while replacing other core values  such as conformity,   activity,   and 
achievement.     Within the complex of core values,   it is suggested that 
conformity,   activity,  and achievement could be shown to be ranked higher 
than individuality,  hence identifying such movements as antithetical. 
Limitations of the  Paradigm 
One major  limitation of the paradigm is by design.     At this  level 
of analysis,   considerations of social power and other social conflict 
precepts are given scant  treatment.     This is purposeful as  those consid- 
erations not covered in this paradigm have received most of the atten- 
tion of students of social conflict  in the past.    Thus this  treatment of 
ideology does not  ignore other crucial  factors but  focuses on one which 
has been given little consideration and examination. 
Another major  limitation of the paradigm is not by design,  but 
lies instead  in the nature of the process  it revolves around—the  sym- 
bolic processes of the human mind.     By its very nature,   any conflict sit- 
uation described in  terms of this process  is  limited to specific cul- 
tures.     For its  application,   first,   the core values of a given culture 
must be determined and their ranking ascertained.    Only then can the 
three change processes as outlined above provide any predictive abilities. 
Utility and Application of the Paradigm 
The utility of the paradigm lies in the ability to project ideol- 
ogy as a symbolic process of referential boundary change into two areas: 
the prediction of a public's perception of a given social movement,   and 
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prediction of a social movement's response to  that anticipated percep- 
tion with regard to  specific choices of tactics and strategies. 
Hypotheses 
Hypotheses  can be generated by the  theoretical  framework of the 
paradigm  for each of these  two areas.     Only a  first  set of hypotheses 
dealing with the public's perception of a social movement in accordance 
with the  change process they represent will constitute the working hy- 
potheses of this  thesis  for empirical  testing. 
The major research hypothesis and three derived hypotheses are as 
follows: 
The  type of symbol transformation process  (I,  II,  or III)  expressed 
by a  social movement's ideology toward components of the already 
established  symbolic universe  accepted as crucial and legitimate 
is predictive of the general public's perception of that movement. 
1) Type I movements will be  less severely perceived than either 
Type   II  or  Type  III movements. 
2) Type II movements will be  less  severely perceived than Type III 
movements,  but more severely perceived than Type I movements. 
3) Type III movements will be more  severely perceived than either 
Type  I or Type II movements. 
In conclusion,   it is not contended that  ideology as  treated in 
this thesis is  the sole determinant of such public perceptions or tactic- 
al responses.    Many other factors are involved such as the characteristics 
of the members of the movement,   the past   level of conflict in the society, 
special  symbolic definitions made by all sides and towards all elements 
of the conflict arena,   and, of course,  happenstances.     Rather,   it  is con- 
tended that   ideology as  treated in this  thesis will yield some measure 
of predictability towards the  two areas mentioned earlier. 
CHAPTER  III 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research design of this thesis revolves around the  research 
hypothesis and the  three   following derived hypotheses mentioned in Chap- 
ter II,  which were: 
The  type of symbol  transformation process  (I,   II,  or III) 
expressed by a  social movement's ideology toward components 
of the already established symbolic universe accepted as 
crucial  and  legitimate  is predictive of the general public's 
perception of  that movement. 
1) Type  I movements will be   less  severely perceived than 
either Type II or Type III movements. 
2) Type  II movements will be  less severely perceived than 
Type  III movements,  but more  severely perceived than 
Type  I movements. 
3) Type   III movements will be more  severely perceived than 
either Type  I or Type II movements. 
Logic £f the Research 
l'rom inspection of the hypotheses above,   three variables are  in- 
volved in testing the hypotheses.    They are:     1)  the  symbol  transforma- 
tion process expressed by a movement's ideology toward a core value, 
2)   the public's perception of that movement,   and 3)   the acceptance of 
that value as crucial and legitimate by the public involved.    The indi- 
cators of  these  variables and their relationships are best explicated 
one by one. 
First,   the  independent variable of the  symbol  transformation pro- 
cess  is  subjective  and not measured directly.     It was measured,  however, 
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by the  subjective grouping of the  social movements undergoing evaluation 
in accordance with the operational definitions of the  symbolic  change- 
processes  stated  in Chapter II.    An empirical  indicator of the effect of 
the  symbol  transformation processes on the public's perception can be 
found in the relationship between the  "agreement" and "disagreement" with 
a core value and the perception of a movement modifying that value.     In 
this case,   the public's perception of the movement was  seen as an infer- 
ential measurement of  the   symbol  transformation process. 
At   this point,   a  tentative   framework for  the projection of this 
variable onto  the data generated by the research instrument must  be 
given.    To do  so,   certain assumptions concerning the ranking and crucial- 
ity of core values were made.     Essentially,   these assumptions are  that 
the values described by Robin Williams   (1960)  are  indeed major value 
orientations  shared by a majority of Americans and,   in part,   that   the 
ranking of those values   (listed in decreasing importance)   is "freedom", 
"equality",   "humanitarianism",   and "morality".    Making these assumptions 
allowed  for the  tentative classification of the social movements  into 
symbol   transformation process groups,   though the  sample  itself determined 
the  final classification of social movements by change-process type 
through ranking and legitimizing the values.    Table I presents this  infor- 
mation. 
In the case of universalistic or particularistic relationships, 
the major values   involved were ascertained readily.     In the case of anti- 
thetical relationships it became more difficult.     This occurred because 
such relationships  are usually outside an existing  symbolic universe. 
Thus, quite   frequently a movement advocating such change actively 
TABLE  I 
TENTATIVE  GROUPING OF  SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
BY SYMBOL TRANSFORMATION PROCESS 
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Social 
Movement 
Pro-abortion 
Movements 
Women's Liberation 
Movement 
Anti-Death Penalty 
Movement 
American Indian 
Movement 
N.A.A.C.P. 
Peace Movement 
Groups 
Gay Liberation 
Movement 
Environmental 
Protection Groups 
Ku Klux Klan 
John Birch Society 
Pro-euthanasia 
Groups 
Symbionese 
Liberation Army 
Palestinian 
Liberation Org. 
Count er-cu1ture 
Movements 
Process 
Group 
Universalistic 
Universalistic 
Universalistic 
Universalistic 
Universalistic 
Universalistic 
Universalistic 
Universalistic 
Particularistic 
Particularistic 
Particularistic 
Antithetical 
Antithetical 
Antithetical 
Major Value(s)   Involved 
Freedom 
Freedom, Equality 
Humanitarianism,  Morality 
Freedom, Equality 
Freedom, Equality 
Humanitarianism 
Freedom, Equality 
Freedom, Rationality 
Freedom, Equality 
Freedom, Equality 
Humanitarianism,  Morality 
Freedom,  Humanitarianism, 
Morality 
Freedom,   Humanitarianism, 
Morality 
Success, Activity, 
Conformity, Wealth 
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threatens  the  entire political  and social  fabric of a  society.     In such 
situations, movements advocating antithetical change may appear to oppose 
all major values—though this may not,  nor usually is not,   their con- 
scious  intent. 
One value,   "freedom",  occurs often in Table  I,   and due to its com- 
plexity requires  special attention.     Of all  the major values in Williams' 
list,   freedom is among the most   complex and abstract,  having many assoc- 
iated dimensions.     "Freedom for" and "freedom from" represent only two 
such dimensions.     In each case where  such dimensions caused difficulty, 
a careful determination was made  to classify a movement  involved with 
"freedom" to the correct process group by considering the most salient 
characteristics of the entire situation. 
The  second variable,   the  public's perception of a movement,   is  the 
dependent variable and is more directly available in terms of measure- 
ment.     Two  indicators  for this variable were included in the research 
instrument.     One  indicator consists of the  sample's expression of agree- 
ment or disagreement  towards  the movements   listed in Table  I.    The other, 
a second indicator of perception,   consists of the sample's verbal de- 
scription of the same movements.     The  assumption here  is high correlation 
between the severity of opinion towards a certain movement and the sever- 
ity of the  descriptive word applied to that movement.     Both indicators 
were used  singularly and  in groupings according to change-process type 
for purpose of detailed analysis. 
The  third variable,   the public's acceptance of  the values under- 
going modification, was  also measured directly.     Its  indicators were ob- 
tained by  soliciting the   sample's  response  to the values  in terms of 
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agreement or disagreement with statements depicting the values,  and 
finally by ranking the values directly according to importance.    Accept- 
ance,   then,  had  two dimensions:     cruciality and legitimacy.     Cruciality 
was perceived as  the ranking of the core values  in terms of relative  im- 
portance,  while   legitimacy was perceived as the general response to  the 
statement(s)   depicting  the value(s).     Cruciality and legitimacy are no 
doubt highly interrelated, but enough difference exists between the two 
concepts  to warrant obtaining  separate data  for each.    While  "accept- 
ance" has  two  indicators,   one   for ranking and one for legitimacy,   they 
were used  interchangeably in analysis. 
The means of testing the hypotheses mentioned earlier was through 
a survey of an appropriate   sample population to see if a measure of pre- 
dictability between indicators was present.    As observed earlier,   the 
hypotheses and the theoretical  framework which generated them are bound 
in their applicability to  specific cultural groups.     Hence,   the research 
instrument   focused exclusively on American society. 
Research Instrument 
The research instrument was designed first to ascertain the core 
values of a  specific culture and to produce a ranking of those values. 
Specifically,   it was designed to obtain reaction to social movements 
whose ideologies advocate change on those core values by the three  sym- 
bolic change processes  isolated in Chapter II.    The symbolic change pro- 
cesses are:     1)   universalism (Type I),   2)  particularism (Type  II),   and 
3) antitheticism  (Type III). 
The  survey instrument had a preliminary section of questions re- 
lating to personal and social characteristics of the respondent   (see 
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Appendix A).     Some characteristics  such as age and college class were 
included  to determine  simply the  composition of the  sample.     Other par- 
ticular characteristics  singled out   for inclusion,  however, were judged 
to be important empirical  indicators   for the study of values and value 
change.     For example,   earlier mention was given to "special symbolic 
definitions of  the conflict arena"  as alternative inputs  into  the pub- 
lic's perception of a social movement.     Thus,   since pro-abortion move- 
ments are being evaluated,   the Catholicism of a respondent may constitute 
a special  input  into a given evaluation of movements beyond the  types of 
symbolic  change    processes  the research instrument was designed to eval- 
uate.     Likewise,   since the Ku Klux Klan and the N.A.A.C.P.   are being 
evaluated,   the ethnic   identity of a respondent may again constitute a 
special  input  into a given evaluation. 
In addition to the preliminary section,   four other major sections 
were included. 
Section I:     The  first major  section consisted of fifteen value 
statements designed to reflect  the  central  core values of American soci- 
ety as isolated by Robin Williams.     As the   first  indicator of "accept- 
ance",   this  section served the purpose of ascertaining if these are 
indeed major value orientations of American society by the overall  sample 
response.     It  also provided a measure of the individual respondent's 
prior adherence  to those values which were of use in analysis. 
Respondents were asked to indicate whether they basically agreed 
or disagreed with each statement.     Only dichotomous responses were re- 
quested or provided  for,   allowing no wider  latitude in potential response. 
This was done purposefully  to   force a decision on the part of the 
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respondents  and  to simplify later analysis.    This response  structure 
eliminated the possibility of an inordinate number of "don't know" or 
"uncertain" responses, which due to  the abstract nature of the  state- 
ments would be highly probable.     The value  statements were constructed 
occasionally in a negative   form so  that disagreement with the statement 
would indicate agreement with the value it depicted. 
Section II:     The  second section consisted of the same values de- 
scribed by Williams with instructions  to rank them according to  the re- 
spondent's evaluation of their relative importance.    As the   second 
indicator of "acceptance",  and specifically,   "ranking",   this  section also 
asked for any additional values which,   in the respondent's opinion, were 
important.     If a new value  introduced by a respondent received support 
from a  large proportion of the   sample population,   it was included as a 
major cultural value   for subsequent  analysis.     The probability of such 
an occurrence was judged  to be very low;   indeed,   it did not  occur. 
The primary purpose of Section II was to ascertain the relative 
importance of these values to the sample population. In the case of a 
social movement advocating mixed change on several core values, the rel- 
ative position of these values was crucial in determining the symbolic 
change-process type of that social movement. This section also served 
the secondary functions of: a) again ascertaining that the core values 
are as depicted by Williams, and if not, b) allowing the list of core 
values  to be corrected by the additions offered by the respondents. 
Section III: The third section was designed to provide the first 
indicator of "public perception". It consisted of fourteen social move- 
ments active   in recent American history with instructions to respond to 
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each movement or its goals by Indicating  strongly agree   (SA),   agree   (A), 
don't know  (DK),  disagree   (D),  or   strongly disagree  (SD). 
Of the major types of attitude scales,   a summated or Likert-Type 
scale was judged most useful.    One advantage  in employing such a scaling 
technique  is  that  scoring  is  simplified—scores of 1 to 5 may be applied 
as appropriate  to each response of SA to SD,  respectively.    One assump- 
tion made  in  so doing was  that a response of SA  (or 1)   for Women's Lib- 
eration    is  essentially of the same  intensity as  a response of SA   (or  1) 
for the Ku Klux Klan.     This was deemed reasonable as all items under 
evaluation belonged to  the  same general class of phenomena,   and  items 
undergoing evaluation were presented in as value-free a manner as possi- 
ble. 
The   second advantage  in using a Likert-type scale is  that such a 
scaling technique allowed respondents  to express the intensity of their 
feelings.     Unlike  the dichotomous technique used in Section I,   this was 
desirable in Section III as it provided more response categories and 
hence  solicited more variance.    While variance  in this case was desira- 
ble,  it had to be kept manageable.     If nine response categories were 
provided,   the variance would yield little additional substantive  support 
for the hypotheses being tested,  and,   in fact, would complicate analysis. 
For this reason a five-point  scale of agreement-disagreement was used. 
The  fourteen social movements   in this  section were chosen because 
each advocates change on one or more   core values discussed in Sections I 
and II,   and because each could be categorized tentatively as to which of 
the three change processes  it represented  (see Table  I).    Although dis- 
cussed earlier,   the matching between movements and change-process  types 
" 
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was done  subjectively and by inspection against an assumed rank order in 
the core complex of values.     Many of the movements advocate  change on 
more than one core cultural value and sometimes with different change 
process types.     When this occurred,   in accordance with the discussion 
concerning mixed processes,   a judgement was made as to which value under- 
going modification was  the highest.     The tentative assignment of social 
movement   to a change-process  type was a recognition that the  sample it- 
self would determine  the rank order of the values and that order might 
differ from the assumed order.     Thus, while the N.A.A.C.P. was  tentative- 
ly assumed to be universalistic on the basis of change advocated on 
"freedom"  and "equality",  if  it advocated another type of change on 
another core value and  that value was ranked higher than the  first  two, 
the movement would then be considered as representative of the  latter 
change process.     This  situation was judged not   likely to occur  frequent- 
ly;   indeed,   it did not occur. 
Tentatively the  fourteen social movements are divided into  three 
groups—each group representing one of the  three change processes.    After 
first ascertaining the core values  and their ranking to be correct,   the 
mean scores of each group were  taken as an indicator of the sample's re- 
sponse  to  the  respective  change process. 
Section IV:     The   fourth and  final  section consisted of the  same 
fourteen social movements  in Section III with instructions to apply one 
descriptive word   (chosen  from a   list of six provided)   to each movement 
(see Appendix A).    This section constituted a verbal description of each 
movement and served as an additional  indicator of the sample's percep- 
tion of each movement and the change process  it represented.     Six  terms 
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were offered to provide  for  some variance  in individual preferences  in 
expression.     For purposes of analysis,  however, only  four basic cate- 
gories of verbal description were coded.     They were:     "reform and pro- 
test",   "rebellion and revolution",   "fad",  and "crime".     In the  first  two 
cases,   the  rationale   for  the coupling was that the terms are close 
enough both in meaning and emotive content that they would add little 
additional predictive ability. 
Sample  Selection 
The   sample  selected  for administration of the research instrument 
was an availability  sample.     It consisted of 224 students of the Univer- 
sity of North Carolina at Greensboro in attendance during the  first 
summer session of 1975.    An attempt was made  to balance  the  sample as  to 
sex and among  the  four college  classes.     This  sample obviously was 
neither random nor stratified and in terms of some characteristics such 
as age,  occupation and educational attainment was not representative of 
the general population.     For the following reasons,  however,   this non- 
representativeness was  judged unimportant: 
First,   even though the  sample as constructed might conceivably 
validate different core cultural values,   it  is expected their validation 
and ranking would nonetheless be essentially congruent with what a random 
sample might reveal.     This  is expected even though the sample might be 
perceived as a   sub-culture or symbolic  sub-universe.    Since  the values 
being dealt with are major ones,   the bulk of any sub-universe differences 
are expected to be  found in  lower order,   empirically referented symbols 
as discussed in Chapter II. 
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Second,   a pretest of this  survey instrument revealed some  diffi- 
culty when administered  to a more complex stratified sample.    The diffi- 
culty centered around a relative unfamiliarity of some elements of the 
general population with recent American current events and hence,   social 
movements.     For  this reason as well,  a university  sample was judged a 
better choice  due to  the  increased interest  in change processes they 
might exhibit as a group.     Related to  this a university sample may also 
have  increased time and ease  to avail  itself of medias communicating 
such activities. 
It was realized that results from such a sample could not be gen- 
eralized. It was hoped, however, the sample was adequate to provide in- 
itial data for the testing of hypotheses. 
Analysis of Data 
Data generated by the  research  instrument consisted of nominal and 
ordinal measures with analysis of that data done on several  levels.     Pre- 
sentation of information in tabular form was produced  for  the  following 
areas:     a)   sample  composition,  b)  ranking of values,  c)   legitimacy of 
values,   d)  consistency between indicators of acceptance,   e)   consistency 
between indicators of acceptance,  e)  consistency between indicators of 
perception,   f)   tests of the research hypothesis,  g)   tests of the derived 
hypotheses,  and  finally,   if warranted,  h)  analysis of selected sample 
characteristics and their effect on perception or acceptance. 
Each of these areas  is described in detail below.     The order of 
presentation is as  it  occurs  in Chapter IV and is identical  to  the list 
above,   except  as otherwise noted. 
:> 
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a) Sample Composition:     Data will be presented on characteristics 
of the  sample  in raw form (percents,   frequency,   etc.)   for  the purpose of 
communicating the basic composition of the  sample.    This  information is 
included in Appendix B,   "Supplementary Tables". 
b) Ranking of Values:     The research  instrument provides a rank 
order   (1 to 14)  of the values described by Williams.    The resulting table 
presenting the mean sample ranking will be used to determine  the   final 
classification of social movements  to a symbolic change-process  type. 
These data will   later be recoded to  two categories of response:     high and 
low.    The division between the categories was determined by the median 
response of the   sample population,   and was then used to generate more de- 
tailed analysis. 
c) Legitimacy of Values:    The research instrument provides per- 
cent agree and disagree  scores  for each value  through the statements de- 
signed to depict  those values.     The  resulting table  lists all values with 
the percent agree and disagree. 
d) Consistency Between Indicators of Acceptance:     Two  indicators 
of acceptance,   specifically "ranking" and "legitimacy",  are measured by 
the research instrument.     It is of value to ascertain the consistency be- 
tween these two as  they  supposedly measure closely correlated dimensions 
of the same variable.     Cross-tabulations of each value ranking by its re- 
spective value  statement will be prepared.    Thus,   the ranking of "free- 
dom" in Section II of the research instrument will be cross-tabulated 
with the responses to  the  "freedom" value  statement  in Section I.    The 
resulting  four-cell  cross-breaks will utilize chi-square  tests   for sta- 
tistical  significance and gamma   tests  for the  strength and direction of 
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the relationship.     From the  14  four-cell cross-breaks,  a table presenting 
only, the   level of  significance,   strength and direction of relationship 
will be prepared. 
e)     Consistency Between Indicators of Perception:     Two indicators 
of the public's perception towards certain social movements are obtained 
by the research instrument.     Again it  is of value to ascertain the con- 
sistency between the two.     Cross-tabulations of each movement's agree- 
ment or  disagreement  scores  in Section III by its respective verbal de- 
scription scores  in Section IV will be prepared.     Before this is done, 
however,   the data  in Section III will be recoded to three response  cate- 
gories of  1)   agree,   2)   don't know,   and 3)  disagree.     The resulting  14 
twelve-cell  cross-breaks will utilize chi-square tests  for statistical 
significance  and gamma  tests  for the  strength and direction of the rela- 
tionship.     From  these  cross-breaks,   a table presenting only the  level of 
significance,   strength and direction of the relationship will be prepared. 
f)     Tests of the Research Hypothesis:     The research hypothesis  in 
restated  form asserts that when social movements are grouped by the three 
symbol  transformation processes described in Chapter II,   there will be a 
difference between the public's perception of those movements by group. 
The independent variable of the change-process does not have an empirical 
indicator,  but  is  subjective and will be projected onto the data as dis- 
cussed earlier.     The rationale  for the identification of the change-pro- 
cess group  to which a movement belongs is   found in the relationship be- 
tween the value   it proposes to modify and    the  sample's overall 
acceptance and ranking of that value. 
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To test   the research hypothesis,   the  fourteen social movements 
will be placed  into  the  three respective change-process groups.    There 
were eight movements in the universalistic group and three  in both the 
particularistic  and antithetical groups.    With a sample size of 224, 
this generates 3136   total  possible perception responses  for each  indica- 
tor of perception. 
Two tables,  one for each indicator of perception, will be pre- 
pared from the  actual combined  frequency in each category of response. 
The resulting  tables will utilize chi-square tests for the  significance 
of any difference present  and gamma tests  for the  strength and direction 
of relationship between the variables.    The data in these  tables and the 
tests of significance will  then directly address  the central  idea of the 
research hypothesis--is  there a significant  difference  in public per- 
ception by process  group? 
g)    Tests of the Derived Hypotheses:     While the research hypo- 
thesis states   there will be a difference between the three groups of 
movements in terras of public perception,  the derived hypotheses predict 
the direction of that difference.     Tests of the three derived hypotheses 
in this case  involve  the two  indicators of perception and the subjective- 
ly imposed variable of  the change-process groups.    The tests are per- 
formed by a comparative analysis of the combined mean scores of the 
three groups of movements  for each of the two  indicators of perception. 
Since the   social movements were classified as representative of a change- 
process  type,   the combined moan score  for a given group of social move- 
ments  is considered an applicable,   though indirect,   score   for  the assoc- 
iatcd process  type. 
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The   same plan of analysis will be utilized for the second indica- 
tor of perception, with the  "verbal description" of a group of movements 
assumed to reflect  the process which the movement represents.     This  level 
of analysis will be expressed in mean precentages by response  category. 
Two tables,   one   for each of the   indicators of perception will be prepar- 
ed to present  these data. 
In conclusion,   if the data warrant detailed analysis of  sample 
characteristics by any indicators,   such tabular  information as "sex by. 
pro-abortion movements",   "religion by. gay liberation movement",  or 
"political orientation by S.L.A." will be prepared. 
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CHAPTER  IV 
TESTS OF HYPOTHESES 
Before discussing the  actual  tests of hypotheses,  several prelim- 
inary topics will be taken up.    These  topics   include discussion of data 
obtained for  the   legitimacy of values,  and data concerning consistency 
between indicators of both legitimacy and perception. 
Legitimacy of Values 
Legitimacy of the core values   for  the purpose of this  study had 
two dimensions:     acceptance and relative ranking.     Data on both were 
necessary to properly apply the typology generated in Chapter II  to  the 
social movements under evaluation. 
Based on  the mean  sample response of the ranking of the core 
values,  Table II presents their relative ranking.     In the  case of the 
highest   (1-7)  values,  discrepancies between the respective mean scores 
was wide,  while  for  the  lowest   (8-14),  the mean scores tended to cluster 
closely together.     In each case, however,   enough discrepancy existed in 
sample ranking to  allow a clean-cut decision as  to relative ranking. 
No additional values suggested by respondents received majority 
support  from the  sample.     Those  additional values which were  introduced 
by respondents tended to be  slight variations and combinations of,  or 
synonyms   for, values included in the original  list. 
From   the   data the  assumed rank order of the values  suggested in 
Chapter  III is  supported—especially in the case  of values undergoing 
proposed modification by the social movements  included  for evaluation. 
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VALUE 
Freedom 
Humanitarianism 
Equality 
Individualism 
Morality 
Success 
Rationality 
Activity 
Practicality 
Democracy 
Progress 
Patriotism 
Wealth 
Conformity 
TABLE  II 
VALUES  BY  SAMPLE  RANKING 
RANKING* 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
*Based on mean sample response;   n-224 
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Secondarily,  by virtue of no additional values receiving widespread 
sample adherence,   some  inferential  support may be taken for the assump- 
tion that  these values  do constitute  legitimate core values. 
A more direct measure of legitimacy is the acceptance of a core 
value by indication of agreement  or disagreement with a general state- 
ment designed  to  depict  that core value.    Table  III, based on data  from 
the  first  section of the research instrument, presents the   level of 
acceptance   for each value  statement. 
Majority acceptance is observed  for each statement with the ex- 
ception of "morality",   "rationality",   "patriotism", and "democracy". 
Several conclusions might be drawn from this,   the most obvious being 
that  these  four are not core values in the sample's judgement.    This, of 
course, may be  the  case;  however,   two other conclusions appear more 
plausible.     First  exists the possibility that  special symbolic dimensions 
or complexities exist  for  these values.     "Morality" is a most diverse 
concept and any one  statement depicting  it may have a high probability of 
generating considerable variance  in a sample's response.     Similar com- 
plexities  for  "patriotism" and "democracy" may be pointed  to in explain- 
ing the  lack of majority acceptance.     Recent American history, both po- 
litical and economic, may have played a role  in such results. 
While  the  issue of  special dimensions may be raised,   the second 
conclusion that   these particular value  statements were inadequately de- 
signed and improperly representative of the value  in question must also 
be considered.     It is  the author's belief that  this conclusion accounts 
for the major part of the  statement's   failure to generate majority 
acceptance,   and  that  these   four values are  legitimate core values. 
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TABLE  III 
VALUE  STATEMENTS  BY  SAMPLE ACCEPTANCE 
Value Statement Agree Disagree Total * 
Success 69.2% 30.87. 100.07. 
Activity 68.3 31.7 100.0 
Morality 47.8 52.2 100.0 
Humanitarianisra 98.2 1.8 100.0 
Practicality 60.7 39.3 100.0 
Progress 56.3 43.7 100.0 
Wealth 80.4 19.6 100.0 
Equality 65.2 34.8 100.0 
Freedom 95.1 4.9 100.0 
Conformity 66.5 33.5 100.0 
Rationality 44.6 55.4 100.0 
Patriotism 5.8 94.2 100.0 
Democracy 28.1 71.9 100.0 
Individualism 71.0 29.0 100.0 
*n=224 
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These difficulties  aside,  on balance,   the data in Tables II and 
III indicate  ample  support   for the assumption that the core values are 
as depicted by Williams.     Thus,   from the support of these data,   the ten- 
tative grouping of social movements  to a change-process group mentioned 
in Table I is considered the  final classification.    This final classifi- 
cation includes eight movements in the Universalistic   (Type I)   group, 
three movements in the Particularistic   (Type II)   group,  and three move- 
ments in the Antithetical   (Type  III)  group. 
Consistency Between Indicators 
It was  suggested in Chapter III that a positive correlation would 
exist between the  two  indicators of acceptance and between the two indi- 
cators of perception.     The results of cross-tabulations between the re- 
spective  indicators are presented in Tables IV and V. 
While Table IV shows no chi-square  level of significance above 
.05,  and only three above   .10,   some mixed support  is  lent  to  the assump- 
tion of a positive correlation between the ranking of values and agree- 
ment with general,  statements depicting the values.     In ten cases,   the 
gamma statistics   indicated a  low positive correlation and in four cases 
negative gamma  statistics were obtained. 
The overall weak results of this analysis of consistency suggests 
two possible  considerations.    First,   that while the assumption of a posi- 
tive correlation between direct ranking and expressions of value state- 
ment acceptance may be a valid one,   it appears to be a very low positive 
correlation.     In retrospect,   it appears probable  that enough substantial 
difference exists between the two to make prediction of one   from the 
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TABLE IV 
SIGNIFICANCE  LEVEL AND  STRENGTH OF RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN  INDICATORS  OF ACCEPTANCE  BY VALUE 
Value 
Success 
Activity 
Morality 
Humanitarianism 
Practicality 
Progress 
Wealth 
Equality 
Freedom 
Conformity 
Rationality 
Patriotism 
Democracy 
Individualism 
Level  of 
Significance* 
.06 
.31 
.18 
.61 
.06 
.22 
.39 
.29 
.10 
.92 
.30 
.07 
.93 
.22 
Strength of 
Relationship** 
+.284 
+.167 
-.193 
+.507 
-.368 
+.021 
+.174 
+.167 
+.133 
-.033 
+.156 
+.637 
+.019 
+.200 
*Chi- square 
**Gamma 
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TABLE V 
SIGNIFICANCE  LEVEL AND STRENGTH OF RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN  INDICATORS  OF PERCEPTION BY MOVEMENT 
Movement 
Pro-abortion Movements 
Counter-culture Movements 
Ku Klux Klan 
Women's Liberation Movement 
Gay Liberation Movement 
John Birch Society 
Pro-euthanasia 
Anti-Death Penalty Movement 
American Indian Movement 
Palestinian Liberation Organization 
Symbionese Liberation Army 
Environmental Protection Groups 
N.A.A.C.P. 
Peace Movement Groups 
*Chi-square 
**Gamma 
Level of 
Significance* 
Strength of 
Relationship** 
.01 -.361 
.02 +.249 
.01 -.555 
.01 +.252 
.01 + .352 
.01 +.023 
.01 -.335 
.01 +.073 
.37 -.057 
.01 +.156 
.02 + .028 
.02 +.578 
.01 +.238 
.02 +.238 
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other difficult,   and perhaps  unprofitable.     Second,   since this analysis 
involved  the value  statements  themselves,   the  same possible  inadequacy 
of design cited earlier may be pointed to as a potential reason for the 
low and even negative correlations. 
In contrast to the results of Table IV, Table V, which presents 
results of analysis of consistency between indicators of perception, 
yields more positive results.     In every case but one,  the chi-square 
levels of significance are  above   .02, with most significant at  the   .01 
level.    Again,  however, mixed support  is   lent  to the assumption of a 
positive correlation.     In one case,   a substantial positive correlation 
was found,   in six a low positive correlation,   in three a negligible posi- 
tive correlation,   and in four,   negative correlations. 
In  the  case of the negative gamma   statistics  several considerations 
merit attention.     The "Pro-abortion Movement" and "Pro-euthanasia Move- 
ment"  impinge heavily on values  relating to morality.     Specifically, 
these movements advocate a  substantial departure from what might be de- 
scribed as modal beliefs concerning the sanctity of life.     This  involve- 
ment may have been operative  in the resulting gamma   statistics,   causing 
some confusion on the part of the  sample. 
In  the  case of the "Ku Klux Klan" and "American Indian Movement", 
recent negative media exposure has been widespread.     It is possible the 
negative exposure played a role  in the  inconsistency between agreement 
with goals and the application of a descriptive word. 
While higher positive  correlations were expected between respec- 
tive indicators,   the  absence of such correlations do not affect the basic 
tests of hypotheses.     As departure points  for future research,   the 
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inconsistencies do,   however,   raise interesting questions. 
Tests of the Research Hypothesis 
It has been hypothesized that a difference exists between public 
perception of social movements on the basis of the symbol transformation 
process represented by  the movement's  ideological relationship to the 
host symbolic universe. 
The  tests of hypotheses are,  as described in Chapter III, based 
on an analysis of  the distribution of total possible sample perception 
responses.     With  fourteen social movements and a sample of 224,   the re- 
search instrument generated a total of 3136 possible perception responses 
for each indicator of perception  (agreement-disagreement and verbal de- 
scription).     For each indicator of perception by change-process type, 
1722 possible perception responses  existed  for the Universalistic  (Type 
I) group of movements,  672  for  the Particularistic   (Type II)  group of 
movements,  and 672  also   for the Antithetical  (Type  III)  group of move- 
ments.    The   frequency  for each category of response by change-process 
type was obtained through combining the raw data in Tables XVI and XVII 
(see Appendix B).     The resulting data presented in Tables VI and VII,   for 
each indicator of perception represents  the combined sample response by 
category for  the three groups of social movements. 
While  a cell-by-cell discussion of frequencies or percents in each 
table could also demonstrate perception differences between the change- 
process types,   the most  succinct  support  for the research hypothesis is 
found  in the  statistical tests of significance and strength of relation- 
ship. 
TABLE VI 
CHANGE-PROCESS  TYPES BY  COMBINED PERCEPTION 
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Perception 
Type SA 
17.5% 
(547) 
1.1 
(36) 
0.7 
(22) 
A DK 
8.0% 
(252) 
5.1 
(160) 
6.0 
(189) 
D SD 
2.7% 
(85) 
7.8 
(245) 
6.4 
(201) 
Total 
I-Univeralistic 
II-Particularistic 
Ill-Antithetical 
22.9% 
(717) 
3.0 
(93) 
2.7 
(83) 
6.1% 
(191) 
4.4 
(138) 
5.6 
(177) 
57.2% 
(1792) 
21.4% 
(672) 
21.4% 
(672) 
Total 19.3% 
(605) 
28.6% 
(893) 
19.1% 
(601) 
16.1% 
(506) 
16.9% 
(531) 
100.0% 
(3136) 
Gamma= +.615 
Probability of chi-square  less than  .001 
TABLE  VII 
CHANGE-PROCESS  TYPES BY COMBINED 
VERBAL DESCRIPTION 
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Type. 
I-Universalistic 
II-Particularistic 
Ill-Antithetical 
Verbal Description 
Reform- 
Protest Fad 
Rebellion- 
Revolution Crime Total 
45.37. 
(1420) 
3.5% 
(HO) 
7.1% 
(220) 
1.3% 
(42) 
57.2% 
(1792) 
10.8 
(337) 
1.0 
(32) 
3.7 
(117) 
5.9 
(189) 
21.4% 
(672) 
4.0 
(127) 
3.2 
(99) 
10.5 
(330) 
3.7 
(116) 
21.4% 
(672) 
60.1% 
(1884) 
7.7% 
(241) 
21.3% 
(667) 
10.9% 
(344) 
100.0% 
(3136) 
Total 
Gamraa= +.635 
Probability of chi-square  less  than   .001 
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In Table VI a  chi-square  significance  level of .001  coupled with 
a high positive correlation of +.615 between the variables of change- 
process type  and the   first  indicator of perception (agreement-disagree- 
ment)  is noted.     Likewise Table VII, presenting data  for the second  in- 
dicator of perception   (verbal description),  yields a chi-square 
significance   level of  .001 coupled with a high positive correlation of 
+.635. 
For each table,  neither  statistic alone is  sufficient   to demon- 
strate adequate  support,  but when considered together they indicate 
strong support   for acceptance of the research hypothesis.    Though these 
results cannot be projected directly into any discussion of the general 
population,  on  the basis of results  obtained in this sample,   the theo- 
retical base of the typology appears  to be tentatively validated and 
deserving of additional research. 
Tests of the Derived Hypotheses 
Having discussed the research hypothesis which predicts a differ- 
ence in public perception by change-process group,   the tests of the de- 
rived hypotheses which predict the direction of that difference may now 
be presented.     Essentially,   the three derived hypotheses may be consider- 
ed interrelated and expressed simply as hypothesizing an increasing sever- 
ity of public perception  from Universalistic to Particularistic to Anti- 
thetical  change-process  type groups of movements. 
The   frequencies  and percentages   in Tables VI and VII could be used 
to demonstrate   the direction of the differences  in perception by change- 
process group.     Those  frequencies and percentages, however,  are based on 
the total possible perception responses generated by the research 
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instrument.    As  such,   they are somewhat cumbersome to utilize in tests 
of the derived hypotheses.     The data in Tables VIII and IX,  which mirrors 
Che data  in Tables VI and XII whose statistical  significance has already 
been discussed,   presents  the  same  relationships  in a recast,   simpler 
form.    The percentages   in Tables VIII and IX are based on the averaged 
mean sample response  for each category of response by change-process 
type groups  for each indicator of perception.    Again,   these  tables are 
combined  forms of the raw data  found in Tables XVI and XVII. 
In Table VIII the  severity of perception,  with a   few exceptions, 
closely follows  the predicted pattern of response.     For example,  the 
percent strongly agree ranges   from 30.5% for the Universalistic group to 
3.3% for  the Antithetical  group, with the Particularistic group in be- 
tween with 5.4%.     The other categories of response also   follow the pre- 
dicted pattern of response with  two exceptions in  the agree and strongly 
disagree categories  for the Particularistic group. 
Table IX shows the  strongest support   for the derived hypotheses. 
As shown,   the percent  response of "reform-protest"  is highest   for the 
Universalistic group and drops  steadily through the other change-process 
type groups.     One exception noted  in the expected pattern of response is 
again  found in the  "crime"  category for  the Particularistic group. 
Consulting the raw data  in Appendix B,   the variations noted in the 
expected pattern of perception center around the "Ku Klux Klan".    Consid- 
erable difficulties and inconsistencies have been associated with this 
organization throughout  the entire analysis of data.     In spite of these 
exceptions,   the  author remains convinced the classification of the Ku 
Da Klan as particularistic  is  correct and can only point   to negative 
TABLE  VIII 
CHANGE-PROCESS  TYPES  BY MEAN 
PERCEPTION 
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Type 
I-Universalistic* 
II-Particularistic** 
Ill-Antithetical*** 
Perception 
SA DK D SD Total 
30.5%      40.0%      14.1%      10.7%        4.7%      100.0% 
5.4 13.9 23.8        20.5        36.4 100.0% 
3.3 12.3 28.1 26.3 29.9 100.0% 
* Based on evaluation of eight movements;  n= 224 
** Based on evaluation of three movements;  n= 224 
*** Based on evaluation of three movements;  n= 224 
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TABLE  IX 
CllANGE-PROCESS  TYPES  BY MEAN 
VERBAL DESCRIPTION 
Verbal Description 
Re f orm- Rebellion- 
Type Protest Fad Revolution Crime Total 
I-Universalistic* 79.3% 6.1% 12.3% 2.3% 100.0% 
II-Particularistic** 50.1 4.8 17.4 27.7 100.0% 
Ill-Antithetical*** 18.9 14.7 49.1 17.3 100.0% 
* Based on evaluation of eight movements;  n= 224 
** Based on evaluation of three movements;  n= 224 
*** Based on evaluation of three movements;  n= 224 
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media exposure  as one possible  special  symbolic complexity involved  in 
these unexpected results. 
These   few exceptions aside,   the data in both Tables VIII and IX 
do follow the  pattern of perception predicted by the derived hypotheses. 
That is    considerable  support  is demonstrated to indicate that Type I 
movements are   least severely perceived, Type II movements are more 
severely perceived,   and Type III movements are most  severely perceived. 
While the  support is mixed,   in part,   it appears ample  to accept the de- 
rived hypotheses as validated and deserving of additional research. 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND  CONCLUSIONS 
The theoretical basis of this  thesis,   the hypotheses generated 
from it,   and  the subsequent data  collected to  test  those hypotheses had 
as their major impetus  an attempt   to integrate certain micro-sociological 
study areas with more macro-  areas of study.     Specifically it might best 
be described as a projection of select  facets of symbolic interactionism 
into a study of the public perception of social movements. 
Review of  literature  in the area of social conflict yields a 
great number of useful  typologies and  schemas  for classifying the many 
diverse dimensions of social movements.    With regard to the public per- 
ception of social movements many characteristics of movements such as 
tactics,   specific  forms of organization, resources utilized,   type of 
leadership, methods of member recruitment, and others have been used with 
varying degrees  of utility.     In each case,  the question of a possible 
unifying typology,  or more  directly the  level of abstraction of that 
possible typology occurred to the author.    This  thesis then is an attempt 
to initiate an exploratory study in the  area of such a possible typology, 
at whatever level of abstraction it might be constructed. 
Of the many possible   levels  that  such a typology might be con- 
structed,   the general  area of the consensual formation,   exchange,  and 
modification of symbols appeared most promising.    With this as the task, 
the thesis began with a review of selected literature searching for a 
valid theoretical basis  for the projection of symbol  formation into the 
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research area.     Following this,  a paradigm of symbolic change processes 
was constructed with symbols,   symbolic universes,   and their objectifica- 
tions as the  foci of  the   study.     A  three-fold typology derived directly 
from the paradigm was  then tested empirically. 
As discussed in Chapter IV,   the empirical  tests of the hypotheses 
focusing on the typology yielded strong support  for the acceptance of 
those hypotheses,   and hence   some validation  for the typology itself. 
From the data obtained it has been demonstrated that a  typology 
based on symbol transformation processes represented by a movement's 
ideological relationship with its host symbolic universe  is useful in 
predicting the public perception of social movements. 
Though mentioned earlier,   it   is believed the utility of this para- 
digm may extend to  the  prediction of  tactical choices by social move- 
ments.    The relationship between the  anticipated public's perception and 
the tactical response of a movement  is perceived as a close one.    While 
not included  in this   study  for empirical testing,   the relationship be- 
tween these two as  they reflect  the relationship between symbol sets and 
their objectification merits   further  study. 
It  is not contended that  such an ideological-symbolic base is the 
sole determinant of a movement's tactical response.    Nor is it contended 
that a typology based on such a dimension is  sufficient to totally ex- 
plain a public's perception of a movement.    Other variables, noted in 
Chapter II,  are also operative and  the  typology developed in this thesis 
represents only one variable in what  is most probably a multiple causa- 
tion situation.     It has been demonstrated, however,   that such a dimen- 
sion is part of  some regression analysis which might be more totally 
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explanatory. 
Beyond these  considerations,   the results of this  study are  tenta- 
tive.    They cannot be considered conclusive  for a number of reasons. 
First    the data   were  obtained  from a  non-random sample which has definite 
implications  for the  generalization of such results.     Second,  as noted 
in Chapter IV,   several methodological difficulties related to  the accep- 
tance and ranking of core values required  further attention.     Finally, 
the typology as  tested depicts "ideal-type" processes which,   in the 
study, were measured   indirectly by existing  social movements.     It  is 
doubtful any social movement could be  described as being purely and ab- 
solutely representative  of any one of the three symbol  transformation 
processes.    Thus,   there  is  a slight,  but carefully controlled,   subjective 
element in the design of the research. 
Suggestions  for possible solutions  for these difficulties might 
properly be offered at   this  time.    A random sample of appropriate  size 
would deal adequately with the  first difficulty.    The difficulties en- 
countered in ascertaining core value acceptance and ranking might be 
dealt with by a more extensive and  inclusive pretest designed solely for 
that purpose.     Finally  there  is no easy remedy for the empirical testing 
of that which is of "ideal-type" in a real world.    One possible alter- 
native might be an entirely different  line of empirical inquiry.    Such a 
research design might  center around in-depth interviews,  using hypo- 
thetical organizations  instead of existing movements.    A technique of 
this type might more directly test  the validity of the typology and aid 
in controlling extraneous variables or emotional considerations which 
often accompany a study of social conflict. 
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In conclusion,   none of  the difficulties or limitations noted 
should be construed as a  lack of confidence in what has been done.     To 
the contrary,   it   is believed the results are sound and represent a small 
step in the  integration of the  two areas mentioned earlier. 
The notation of  such difficulties and limitations should, how- 
ever    be viewed as a desire to  improve upon what has been done.    This 
should always be  the case as no approach is an end,  only a beginning 
point  for further  study. 
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APPENDIX A 
THE DATA-COLLECTION INSTRUMENT 
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a) 
d) 
SOCIAL MOVEMENT STUDY 
The following questionnaire is being used for thesis research 
in the Department of Sociology at UNC-G.    We will appreciate your 
co-operation in this   study of social movements in America. 
Please  do not  identify yourself in any way as your identity 
is not required.    Be assured that all information obtained or pub- 
lished from this study will be reported in a purely statistical 
fashion with no personal identification made. 
Age: 
1) 19 or under  
2) 20  to 29  
3) 30 to 39  
4) 40 and over  
b)     Ethnic Identity: 
1) White  
2) Black  
3) Am.  Indian  
4) Oriental  
5) 0ther_ 
Religious Affiliation: 
1) Catholic  
2) Protestant   (Please  Specify)_ 
3) Jewish  
4) Other   (Please Specify)  
5) None  
f) Sex:     1)  Male  2)   Female  
c)    Political Orientation: 
1) Liberal  
2) Conservative  
3) Other  (Please 
Specify) 
e)     College Class: 
1) Freshman  
2) Sophomore  
3) Junior  
4) Senior  
5) Other (Please 
Specify)  
lt Please respond to  the  following statements by indicating 
whether you basically agree or disagree.    While you may not agree or 
disagree completely with some of the statements,  try to decide which 
answer would best  indicate your leaning toward the content of the 
statement. 
1) A person will be happy or  fulfilled only when he works and strives 
to achieve. Agree  Disagree  
2) Even if a person were wealthy he should want  to work at some job. 
Agree  Disagree  
3) There  is no  such thing as absolute right or wrong;  only shades of 
gray. A8ree  Disagree  
4) People  should help each other out in ttaes of disaster. 
Agree  Disagree  
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5) Philosophy and theology are  fine but man's main goal should be to 
solve his practical problems on earth.    Agree Disagree 
6) Some  events  in recent American history have been disturbing, but in 
the end we will emerge a better nation. Agree  Disagree  
7) People  should enjoy themselves as much as their finances allow and 
maintain as  good a  lifestyle as possible. 
Agree  Disagree  
8) I tend to believe all human beings are interrelated as in one big 
family. Agree  Disagree  
9) By nature people are basically competitive and conflictful. 
Agree  Disagree  
10) One of  the most  important   factors in a person's life  is the ability 
to make his own decisions. Agree  Disagree  
11) Society has  the  right and the responsibility to control the actions 
of individuals  for  the good of the majority. 
Agree  Disagree  
12) All our problems are created by man,  and so man has the ability to 
solve  them. Agree  Disagree  
13) A person can have no other real home outside of the country where he 
is born. Agree  Disagree  
14) Most people are  incapable of governing themselves efficiently. 
Agree  Disagree  
15) An individual   should rely on himself to meet his needs--not the 
government or  society in general. Agree  Disagree  
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II. Previous research has  frequently shown the  following values 
to be central to Americans.    Please rank these in order of their 
importance to you by placing a 1 beside the most important, a 2 
beside the next most important,  and so on.     If there are other 
values you  feel should be included, please  list and rank them in 
the  final blank spaces. 
Success  
Activity_ 
Morality, 
Humanitarianism_ 
Practicality  
Progress  
Health 
Individualism_ 
Conformity  
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III, In terms of your agreement with these groups or sympathy with 
their goals,  please respond to each of the  following social movements 
by indicating whether you strongly agree   (SA), agree   (A), don't know 
(DK) ,  disagree   (D),   or strongly disagree   (SD).    Do so by placing an 
"X"  in the  space after the appropriate category. 
1) Pro-abortion Movements 
2) Counter  Culture Movements 
(Hippie movements,   communes,   etc.) 
3) The Ku Klux Klan 
4) Women's Liberation Movement 
5) Gay Liberation Movement 
(Homosexual Equality) 
6) The John Birch Society 
7) Pro-euthanasia groups 
(Mercy killing) 
8) Anti-Death Penalty Movements SA      A      DK      D 
9) American Indian Movement 
(AIM--the Indians at 
Wounded Knee) 
10) Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (P.L.O.) 
11) Symbionese Liberation Army 
12) Environmental Protection Groups 
13) The N.A.A.C.P. 
14) Peace Movement groups 
SA A_ _DK_ _D_ _SD  
SA  A _DK_ _D_ _SD  
SA  A _DK_ _D_ _SD  
SA  A DK D SD 
SA  A _DK_ _D_ _SD  
SA  A DK D SD 
SA  A _DK_ _D_ _SD  
_ __ _ _SD  
SA  A DK D SD 
SA DK       D       SD 
SA A_ 
SA A_ 
SA A_ 
SA      A 
DK      D SD_ 
DK       D       SD 
DK       D       SD_ 
DK       D       SD_ 
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TO Assuming  that you could choose only from this  list of descriptive 
"words     choose  the word that best describes each movement and place the 
number of that word in the  space next to the movement.    The same word 
may be used more than once. 
1) Rebellion 
2) Fad 
3) Protest 
4) Crime 
5) Reform 
6) Revolution 
Descriptive Words 
1) Pro-abortion Movements 
2) Counter Culture Movements 
3) The Ku Klux Klan 
4) Women's Liberation Movement 
5) Gay Liberation Movement 
6) The John Birch Society 
7) Pro-euthanasia groups 
8) Anti-Death Penalty Movements 
9) American Indian Movement 
10) Palestinian Liberation 
Organization 
11) Symbionese Liberation Army 
12) Environmental Protection groups 
13) The N.A.A.C.P. 
14) Peace Movement  groups 
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APPENDIX  B 
SUPPLEMENTARY  TABLES 
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TABLE X 
SAMPLE  DISTRIBUTION  BY AGE 
h&L 
19 or under 
20 to 29 
30  to 39 
40 and over 
Total 
Sample 
Size 
21 
155 
27 
21 
224 
% of Total 
Sample 
9.47. 
69.2 
12.1 
9.4 
100.07. 
.TABLE XI 
SAMPLE  DISTRIBUTION  BY  POLITICAL ORIENTATION 
Political 
Orientation 
Liberal 
Conservative 
Other 
Total 
Sample 
Size 
7. of Total 
Sample 
112 50.07. 
78 34.8 
34 15.2 
224 100.07. 
TABLE XII 
SAMPLE  DISTRIBUTION  BY  SEX 
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Sex 
Male 
Female 
Total 
Class  
Freshman 
Sophomore 
Junior 
Senior 
Graduate 
Other 
Sample 
Size 
84 
140 
224 
of Total 
Sample 
37.5% 
62.5 
100.0% 
TABLE XIII 
SAMPLE  DISTRIBUTION BY  CLASS 
Sample % of Total 
Size Sample 
8 3.6% 
18 8.0 
43 19.2 
76 33.9 
67 29.9 
12 5.4 
Total 224 100.0% 
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-TABLE XIV 
SAMPLE  DISTRIBUTION  BY  RELIGION 
Religion 
Catholic 
Protestant 
Jewish 
Other 
None 
Total 
Sample 
Size 
13 
174 
1 
9 
27 
224 
of Total 
Sample 
5.87. 
77.7 
0.4 
4.0 
12.1 
100.07. 
TABLE XV 
SAMPLE  DISTRIBUTION BY  ETHNIC   IDENTITY 
Ethnic Sample 7. of Total 
Identity Size Sample 
White 209 93.3% 
Black 12 5.4 
American Indian 1 0.4 
Other 2 0.9 
Total 224 100.07. 
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TABLE XVI 
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS  BY  PERCEPTION 
Social Perception 
Total 
100.07. 
(224) 
Movement SA 
42.9% 
(96) 
A DK 
9.4% 
(21) 
D SD 
4.9% 
(9) 
Pro-abortion 
Movements 
37.17. 
(83) 
6.77. 
(15) 
Counter-culture 
Movements 
6.7 
(15) 
27.2 
(61) 
25.0 
(56) 
32.2 
(72) 
8.9 
(20) 
100.0 
(224) 
1.8 0.9 5.4 23.7 68.2 100.0 
Ku Klux Klan (4) (2) (12) (53) (153) (224) 
Women's Liberation 
Movement 
28.1 
(63) 
52.7 
(118) 
7.6 
(17) 
9.4 
(21) 
2.2 
(5) 
100.0 
(224) 
Gay Liberation 
Movement 
12.1 
(27) 
29.9 
(67) 
21.9 
(49) 
19.2 
(43) 
17.9 
(38) 
100.0 
(224) 
John Birch 
Society 
2.2 
(5) 
4.5 
(10) 
37.9 
(85) 
25.5 
(57) 
29.9 
(67) 
100.0 
(224) 
Pro-euthanasia 
Movements 
12.1 
(27) 
36.2 
(81) 
28.1 
(63) 
12.5 
(28) 
11.9 
(25) 
100.0 
(224) 
Anti-Death  Penalty 
Movements 
21.4 
(48) 
23.2 
(52) 
16.1 
(36) 
28.6 
(64) 
11.7 
(24) 
100.0 
(224) 
American Indian 
Movement 
25.0 
(56) 
46.0 
(103) 
22.8 
(5D 
5.4 
(12) 
0.8 
(2) 
100.0 
(224) 
Palestinian 
Liberation Org. 
2.2 
(5) 
8.0 
(18) 
43.3 
(97) 
23.7 
(53) 
22.8 
(51) 
100.0 
(224) 
Symbionese 
Liberation Army 
0.9 
(2) 
1.8 
(4) 
16.1 
(36) 
23.2 
(52) 
58.0 
(130) 
100.0 
(224) 
Environmental 
Protection Groups 
61.6 
(138) 
34.8 
(78) 
1.8 
(4) 
1.3 
(3) 
0.5 
(1) 
100.0 
(224) 
N.A.A.C.P. 
20.1 
(45) 
51.3 
(115) 
17.9 
(40) 
8.5 
(19) 
2.2 
(5) 
100.0 
(224) 
Peace Movement 
Organizations 
33.0 
(74) 
45.1 
(101) 
15.2 
(34) 
6.3 
(14) 
0.4 
(1) 
100.0 
(224) 
TABLE XVII 
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS  BY VERBAL DESCRIPTION 
Movement 
Pro-abortion 
Movements 
Counter-culture 
Movements 
Ku Klux Klan 
Women's  Liberation 
Movement 
Gay Liberation 
Movement 
John Birch Society 
Pro-euthanasia 
Movements 
Anti-Death  Penalty 
Movement 
American Indian 
Movement 
Palestinian 
Liberation Org. 
Symbionese 
Liberation Army 
Environmental 
Protection Groups 
N.A.A.C.P. 
Peace Movement 
Organizations 
Verbal 
9, 
Reform- 
Protest Fad 
—, .. 
Rebellion- 
Revolution Crime Total 
85.3% 
(191) 
1.37. 
(3) 
6.37. 
(14) 
7.1% 
(16) 
100.0% 
(224) 
27.2 
(61) 
39.3 
(88) 
33.5 
(75) 
0.0 
(0) 
100.0 
(224) 
21.4 
(48) 
0.9 
(2) 
22.3 
(50) 
55.4 
(124) 
100.0 
(224) 
77.7 
(174) 
6.7 
(15) 
15.2 
(34) 
0.4 
(1) 
100.0 
(224) 
64.7 
(145) 
18.8 
(42) 
13.8 
(31) 
2.7 
(6) 
100.0 
(224) 
52.7 
(118) 
9.8 
(22) 
23.7 
(53) 
13.8 
(31) 
100.0 
(224) 
76.3 
(171) 
3.6 
(8) 
6.3 
(14) 
13.8 
(31) 
100.0 
(224) 
87.5 
(196) 
2.7 
(6) 
4.0 
(9) 
5.8 
(13) 
100.0 
(224) 
61.6 
(138) 
1.3 
(3) 
36.6 
(82) 
0.5 
(1) 
100.0 
(224) 
22.8 
(51) 
1.8 
(4) 
55.3 
(124) 
20.1 
(45) 
100.0 
(224) 
6.7 
(15) 
3.1 
(7) 
58.5 
(131) 
31.7 
(71) 
100.0 
(224) 
91.1 
(204) 
3.6 
(8) 
4.9 
(ID 
0.4 
(1) 
100.0 
(224) 
88.4 
(198) 
0.9 
(2) 
8.9 
(20) 
1.8 
(4) 
100.0 
(224) 
77.7 
(174) 
13.8 
(31) 
8.5 
(19) 
0.0 
(0) 
100.0 
(224) 
